The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the US: Summary of Theory, Data, Methods, and Results: Report #1 in the series: The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the United States, based on 1990-1991 Data  by Delucchi, Mark A.
UC Davis
Research Reports
Title
The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the US: Summary of Theory, Data, 
Methods, and Results: Report #1 in the series: The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle 
Use in the United States, based on 1990-1991 Data 
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4tt4d75f
Author
Delucchi, Mark A.
Publication Date
1998-12-01
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
Institute of Transportation Studies ◦ University of California, Davis 
1605 Tilia Street ◦ Davis, California 95616 
PHONE (530) 752-6548 ◦ FAX (530) 752-6572 
www.its.ucdavis.edu 
 
 
Research Report – UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(01)_rev1 
 
 
 
 
The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle 
Use in the US: Summary of Theory, Data,  
Methods, and Results 
 
 
December 1998 
 
 
Mark A. Delucchi 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ANNUALIZED SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE IN 
THE U. S., 1990-1991: SUMMARY OF THEORY, DATA, METHODS, 
AND RESULTS 
 
 
Report #1 in the series: The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the 
United States, based on 1990-1991 Data  
 
 
UCD-ITS-RR-96-3 (1) rev. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark A. Delucchi 
 
Institute of Transportation Studies 
University of California 
Davis, California  95616 
 
madelucchi@ucdavis.edu 
www.its.ucdavis.edu/faculty/delucchi.htm 
 
 
June 1998 
 
Minor revisions October 2004 
 
 
 
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This report is one in a series that documents an analysis of the full social cost of 
motor-vehicle use in the United States. The series is entitled The Annualized Social Cost of 
Motor-Vehicle Use in the United States, based on 1990-1991 Data. Support for the social-cost 
analysis was provided by Pew Charitable Trusts, the Federal Highway Administration 
(through Battelle Columbus Laboratory), the University of California Transportation 
Center, the University of California Energy Research Group (now the University of 
California Energy Institute), and the U. S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment.  
Many people provided helpful comments and ideas. In particular, I thank Patrick 
DeCorla-Souza, David Greene, Gloria Helfand, Arthur Jacoby, Bob Johnston, Charles 
Komanoff, Alan Krupnick, Charles Lave, Douglass Lee, Paul Leiby, Steve Lockwood, 
Paul McCarthy, Don McCubbin, Peter Miller, James Murphy, Steve Plotkin, Jonathan 
Rubin, Dan Santini, Ken Small, Brandt Stevens, Jim Sweeney, Todd Litman, and Quanlu 
Wang for reviewing or discussing parts of the series, although not necessarily this 
particular report.  Of course, I alone am responsible for the contents of this report. 
 
 ii 
REPORTS IN THE UCD SOCIAL-COST SERIES 
 
There are 21 reports in this series. Each report has the publication number UCD-ITS-RR-
96-3 (#), where the # in parentheses is the report number.  
 
Report 1:  The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the U.S., 1990-1991: 
Summary of Theory, Methods, Data, and Results (M.  Delucchi) 
 
Report 2:  Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues in the Analysis of the Social 
Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use (M.  Delucchi) 
 
Report 3:  Review of Some of the Literature on the Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use (J. 
Murphy and M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 4:  Personal Nonmonetary Costs of Motor-Vehicle Use (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 5:  Motor-Vehicle Goods and Services Priced in the Private Sector (M. 
Delucchi) 
 
Report 6:  Motor-Vehicle Goods and Services Bundled in the Private Sector (M. 
Delucchi, with J. Murphy) 
 
Report 7:  Motor-Vehicle Infrastructure and Services Provided by the Public Sector (M. 
Delucchi, with J. Murphy) 
 
Report 8: Monetary Externalities of Motor-Vehicle Use (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 9:  Summary of the Nonmonetary Externalities of Motor-Vehicle Use (M. 
Delucchi) 
 
Report 10: The Allocation of the Social Costs of Motor-Vehicle Use to Six Classes of 
Motor Vehicles (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 11: The Cost of the Health Effects of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles (D. 
McCubbin and M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 12:   The Cost of Crop Losses Caused by Ozone Air Pollution from Motor 
Vehicles (M. Delucchi, J. Murphy, J. Kim, and D. McCubbin) 
 
Report 13: The Cost of Reduced Visibility Due to Particulate Air Pollution from Motor 
Vehicles (M. Delucchi, J. Murphy, D. McCubbin, and J. Kim) 
 
Report 14: The External Damage Cost of Direct Noise from Motor Vehicles (M. 
Delucchi and S. Hsu) (with separate 100-page data Appendix) 
 
Report 15: U.S. Military Expenditures to Protect the Use of Persian-Gulf Oil for Motor 
Vehicles (M. Delucchi and J. Murphy) 
 
 iii 
Report 16: The Contribution of Motor Vehicles and Other Sources to Ambient Air 
Pollution (M. Delucchi and D. McCubbin) 
 
Report 17: Tax and Fee Payments by Motor-Vehicle Users for the Use of Highways, 
Fuels, and Vehicles (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 18:   Tax Expenditures Related to the Production and Consumption of 
Transportation Fuels (M. Delucchi and J. Murphy) 
 
Report 19: The Cost of Motor-Vehicle Accidents (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 20: Some Comments on the Benefits of Motor-Vehicle Use (M. Delucchi) 
 
Report 21: References and Bibliography (M. Delucchi) 
 
 
To get copies of the reports: 
 
1). Most reports are posted as pdf files on Delucchi’s faculty page on the UC Davis ITS 
web site: www.its.ucdavis.edu/faculty/delucchi.htm.  
 
2). You can order hard copies of the reports from ITS:  
 
A. fax: (530) 752-6572 
B. e-mail: itspublications@ucdavis.edu 
C. ITS web site: http://www.its.ucdavis.edu 
D. mail: Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, One Shields 
Avenue, Davis, California  95616 attn: publications  
 
For general information about ITS, call (530) 752-6548.  
 
ITS charges for hard copies of the reports. The average cost is $10 per report. You 
can get a cost list before hand, of course. Or, you can have them send the reports 
with an invoice.  
 
3) The University of California Transportation Center (UCTC) has posted Report #1, the 
summary, on its website, as a PDF file. (They might post more later). Go to 
“Delucchi” in the alphabetical list at: 
 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~uctc/text/papersuctc.html 
 
4) FHWA, Planning Analysis Division, Office of Planning, 400 Seventh Street, S. W., Rm 
3232, Washington, D. C., 20590, has a limited number of copies of Report #1.  
 iv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AND OTHER NAMES 
 
The following are used throughout all the reports of the series, although not necessarily 
in this particular report 
 
AER = Annual Energy Review  (Energy Information Administration) 
AHS = American Housing Survey (Bureau of the Census and others) 
ARB = Air Resources Board 
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics (U. S. Department of Labor) 
BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis (U. S. Department of Commerce) 
BTS = Bureau of Transportation Statistics (U. S. Department of Transportation) 
CARB = California Air Resources Board 
CMB = chemical mass-balance [model] 
CO = carbon monoxide 
dB = decibel 
DOE = Department of Energy 
DOT = Department of Transportation 
EIA = Energy Information Administration (U. S. Department of Energy) 
EPA = United States Environmental Protection Agency 
EMFAC = California’s emission-factor model 
FHWA = Federal Highway Administration (U. S. Department of Transportation) 
FTA = Federal Transit Administration (U. S. Department of Transportation) 
GNP = Gross National Product 
GSA = General Services Administration 
HC = hydrocarbon 
HDDT = heavy-duty diesel truck 
HDDV = heavy-duty diesel vehicle 
HDGT = heavy-duty gasoline truck 
HDGV = heavy-duty gasoline vehicle 
HDT = heavy-duty truck 
HDV = heavy-duty vehicle 
HU = housing unit 
IEA = International Energy Agency 
IMPC = Institutional and Municipal Parking Congress 
LDDT = light-duty diesel truck 
LDDV = light-duty diesel vehicle 
LDGT = light-duty gasoline truck 
LDGV = light-duty gasoline vehicle 
LDT = light-duty truck 
LDV = light-duty vehicle 
MC = marginal cost 
MOBILE5 = EPA’s mobile-source emission-factor model. 
MSC = marginal social cost 
MV = motor vehicle 
NIPA = National Income Product Accounts 
NOx = nitrogen oxides 
NPTS = Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey 
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 v 
O3 = ozone 
OTA = Office of Technology Assessment (U. S. Congress; now defunct) 
PART5 = EPA’s mobile-source particulate emission-factor model 
PCE = Personal Consumption Expenditures (in the National Income Product Accounts) 
PM = particulate matter 
PM10 = particulate matter of 10 micrometers or less aerodynamic diameter 
PM2.5 = particulate matter of 2.5 micrometers or less aerodynamic diameter 
PMT = person-miles of travel 
RECS = Residential Energy Consumption Survey 
SIC = standard industrial classification 
SOx = sulfur oxides 
TIA = Transportation in America 
TSP = total suspended particulate matter 
TIUS = Truck Inventory and Use Survey (U. S. Bureau of the Census) 
USDOE = U. S. Department of Energy 
USDOL = U. S. Department of Labor 
USDOT = U. S. Department of Transportation 
VMT = vehicle-miles of travel 
VOC = volatile organic compound 
WTP = willingness-to-pay 
 
 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... ii 
REPORTS IN THE UCD SOCIAL-COST SERIES .................................................................... ii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AND OTHER NAMES ........................... iv 
1. THE ANNUALIZED SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE IN 
THE U. S., 1990-1991: SUMMARY OF THEORY, DATA, METHODS, 
AND RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2  WHY AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE 
IN THE U.S.? ................................................................................................................ 2 
1.2.1  The purpose of a social-cost analysis ...................................................... 2 
1.2.2  The context .................................................................................................. 4 
1.3   THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 6 
1.3.1  The annualized cost of motor-vehicle use in the U.S. ........................... 6 
1.3.2  What counts as a cost of motor-vehicle use or 
infrastructure? .......................................................................................... 7 
1.3.3  How to interpret “the cost of all motor-vehicle use in 
the U.S.” ..................................................................................................... 7 
1.3.4 Benefits versus costs ................................................................................... 9 
1.3.5  Some minor conceptual issues. .............................................................. 10 
1.3.6  Classification of components of the total social cost ........................... 10 
1.4  COMPONENTS OF THE SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE ............................. 13 
1.4.1  Column 1 of Table 1-1: Personal nonmonetary costs of 
motor-vehicle use. .................................................................................. 13 
1.4.2  Column 2 of Table 1-1:  Motor-vehicle goods and 
services priced in the private sector (estimated net of 
producer surplus and taxes and fees). ................................................ 14 
1.4.3  Column 3 of Table 1-1:  Motor-vehicle goods and 
services bundled in the private sector ................................................ 16 
1.4.4  Column 4 of Table 1-1: Motor-vehicle infrastructure 
and services provided by the public sector. ....................................... 18 
1.4.5  Column 5 of Table 1-1: Monetary externalities of 
motor-vehicle use. .................................................................................. 19 
1.4.6  Column 6a of Table 1-1: Nonmonetary externalities of 
motor-vehicle use. .................................................................................. 19 
1.4.7   Column 6b of Table 1-1: Nonmonetary costs of 
infrastructure .......................................................................................... 21 
1.4.8  Summary observations regarding Table 1-1 ........................................ 21 
1.4.9  The quality of the estimates .................................................................... 23 
1.5  THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 23 
1.5.1  Allocation of costs to individual vehicle categories ............................ 23 
1.5.2   How the results of this analysis should not be used .......................... 23 
1.6  SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 25 
1.7  REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 26 
 vii 
 
TABLE  1-1. CLASSIFICATION OF THE COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE .................................... 33 
TABLE 1-2. EFFICIENT PRICING OF MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES .......................... 34 
TABLE 1-3.  DESCRIPTION OF OUR RATINGS OF THE QUALITY AND 
COMPLEXITY OF OUR ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 36 
TABLE 1-4. PERSONAL NONMONETARY COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1991 
(BILLION 1991$) ........................................................................................................ 37 
TABLE 1-5. MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES PRICED IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR (COST ESTIMATED NET OF PRODUCER SURPLUS AND 
TAXES AND FEES), 1991 (BILLION 1991$) ................................................................ 38 
TABLE 1-6. MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES BUNDLED IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR , 1991 (BILLION 1991$) ............................................................................... 40 
TABLE 1-7. MOTOR-VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES AND SERVICES 
PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1991 (109 $) .................................................... 41 
TABLE 1-8.  MONETARY EXTERNALITIES OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1991 
(BILLION 1991$) ........................................................................................................ 44 
TABLE 1-9A NONMONETARY EXTERNALITIES OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1990-
91 (BILLION 1991$) ................................................................................................... 45 
TABLE CONTINUED. (COSTS NOT ESTIMATED HERE) ................................................................ 46 
TABLE 1-9B. NONMONETARY ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF THE 
MOTOR-VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................................... 46 
TABLE 1-10.  SUMMARY OF THE COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE ............................................ 47 
 
FIGURE 1-1.  SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MOTOR VEHICLE USE ................................ 48 
APPENDIX A. USE OF SOCIAL COST ESTIMATES TO EVALUATE THE 
COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS .................................................................... 49 
1.A.1 Use of concepts, data, methods, and models ....................................... 49 
1.A.2 Use of unit-cost results derived from detailed cost 
functions. ................................................................................................. 49 
1.A.3  Use of simple average costs ................................................................... 52 
1.A.4  Cost allocation factors ............................................................................ 53 
TABLE 1-A1. SUMMARY OF THE HEALTH, VISIBILITY, AND AGRICULTURE COST 
OF EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES .................................................................. 54 
TABLE 1-A2. THE MARGINAL COST OF NOISE FROM A 10% INCREASE IN VMT, 
FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF VEHICLES ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
ROADS, IN URBANIZED AREAS: BASE-CASE RESULTS (1991$/1000-
VMT) ......................................................................................................................... 55 
TABLE 1-A3. SUMMARY OF THE EXTERNAL COSTS OF OIL USE (1991$/END-
USE GALLON) ............................................................................................................ 56 
TABLE 1-A4. THE COST OF TRAVEL TIME IN MOTOR VEHICLES 
(CENTS/PERSON-MILE) ............................................................................................ 58 
TABLE 1-A5. TRANSPORTATION QUANTITIES AND ALLOCATION FACTORS FOR 
GASOLINE AND DIESEL MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE U.S., 1991 ............................... 59 
APPENDIX B. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND EFFICIENT 
OPERATION OF MARKETS ............................................................................................... 61 
1.B.1 Conditions for existence of markets ....................................................... 61 
1.B.2  Conditions for efficiency ........................................................................ 62 
 viii 
FIGURE 1-B1. THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING LONG-RUN MARGINAL COST ............................ 65 
FIGURE 1-B2. EFFICIENCY LOSS DUE TO MONOPOLY ................................................................ 66 
FIGURE 1-B3. EFFICIENCY LOSS DUE TO TAXES ......................................................................... 67 
APPENDIX C. OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS, DATA, AND ESTIMATION 
METHODS FOR SOME OF THE COST ITEMS IN TABLE 1-1. ..................................... 68 
1.C.1  Column 1 of Table 1-1 ............................................................................. 68 
1.C.2  Column 2 of Table 1-1 ............................................................................. 69 
1.C.3  Column 3 of Table 1-1 ............................................................................. 71 
1.C.4  Column 4 of Table 1-1 ............................................................................. 72 
1.C.5  Column 5 of Table 1-1 ............................................................................. 74 
1.C.6  Columns 6a and 6b of Table 1-1 ............................................................ 76 
APPENDIX D. PAYMENTS BY MOTOR-VEHICLE USERS FOR THE USE 
OF THE HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC MOTOR-
VEHICLE SERVICES ............................................................................................................. 80 
1.D.1 Current user taxes and fees are not efficient charges for 
government-provided motor-vehicle infrastructure 
and services. ............................................................................................ 80 
1.D.2   An estimate of tax and fee payments .................................................. 82 
TABLE 1-D1. PAYMENTS BY MOTOR-VEHICLE USERS FOR THE USE OF THE 
HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC SERVICES RELATED TO 
MOTOR-VEHICLE USE (BILLION 1991$) ................................................................... 84 
 
 1 
1. THE ANNUALIZED SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE IN 
THE U. S., 1990-1991: SUMMARY OF THEORY, DATA, METHODS, 
AND RESULTS 
 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
 Every year, Americans drivers spend hundreds of billions of dollars on highway 
transportation.  They pay for vehicles, maintenance, repair, fuel, lubricants, tires, parts, 
insurance, parking, tolls, registration, fees, and other items. These expenditures buy 
Americans considerable personal mobility and economic productivity.  
 But the use of motor vehicles costs society more than the hundreds of billions of 
dollars spent on explicitly priced motor-vehicle goods and services in the private sector. 
Some of the motor-vehicle goods and services provided in the private sector are not 
priced explicitly , but rather are bundled in the prices of nontransportation goods and 
services. For example, “free” parking at a shopping mall is unpriced, but it is not 
costless; the cost is included -- bundled-- in the price of goods and services sold at the 
mall1.  
 In addition to these priced or bundled private-sector costs, there are public-sector 
costs: the tens of billions of dollars spent every year to build and maintain roads, and to 
provide a wide range of services that support the use of motor vehicles. These services 
include police protection, the judicial and legal system, the prison system, fire 
protection, environmental regulation, energy research and regulation, military 
protection of oil supplies, and more. 
 And finally, beyond these monetary  public and private-sector cost are the 
nonmonetary  costs of motor-vehicle use -- those costs that are not valued in dollars in 
normal market transactions2.  There are a wide variety of nonmonetary costs, including 
the health effects of air pollution, pain and suffering due to accidents, and travel time. 
Some of these nonmonetary costs, such as air pollution, are externalities; others, such as 
travel time in uncongested conditions, are what I will call personal nonmonetary costs3.    
 The total national social cost of motor-vehicle use is the sum of all of the costs 
mentioned previously: explicitly priced private-sector costs, bundled private-sector 
costs, public-sector costs, external costs, and personal nonmonetary costs. These costs 
are listed and classified more rigorously in Table 1-1.  
  Over the past three years, my colleagues and I at the University of California 
have been doing a detailed analysis of some of the costs of motor-vehicle use in the U.S.  
In this paper, I explain the purpose of estimating the total social-cost of  motor-vehicle 
use, briefly review recent research, explain the conceptual framework and cost 
classification, and present and discuss our preliminary cost estimates.  
 
                                                
1I do not imply that bundling necessarily is inefficient, and that parking, for example, must be priced. 
This is discussed more later, and in Report #6. 
 
2In some cases, one can estimate shadow prices or implicit values of nonmarket goods by using valuation 
techniques such as hedonic price analysis.  
 
3Also, some of the monetary costs included in the $800 billion of private expenditure actually are 
externalities. I discuss this more below. 
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1.2  WHY AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE IN 
THE U.S.? 
 
1.2.1  The purpose of a social-cost analysis 
  Researchers have performed social-cost analyses for a variety reasons, and have 
used them in a variety of ways, to support a wide range of policy positions. Some 
researchers have used social-cost analyses to argue that motor vehicles and gasoline are 
terrifically underpriced, while others have used them to downplay the need for drastic 
policy intervention in the transportation sector. In any case, social-cost analyses usually 
excite considerable interest, if only because nearly all of us use motor vehicles.   
 By itself, however, a social-cost analysis does not determine whether motor-
vehicle use is good or bad, or better or worse than some alternative, or whether it is 
wise to tax gasoline or restrict automobile use or encourage travel in trains. Rather, a 
social-cost analysis is but one of many pieces of information that might be useful to 
transportation analysts and policymakers.  
 A social-cost analysis can provide several kinds of information, which can be 
used for several purposes. A social-cost analysis can provide: i) general cost data, 
references, methods, and cost models4; ii) marginal unit-cost estimates derived from 
detailed cost models (e.g., $/kg of pollutant emitted; see Appendix A); and iii) simple 
estimates of total cost and average cost (which is total cost divided by total quantity). 
These data, models, unit costs, and results can help analysts: i) evaluate the costs of 
transportation projects, policies, and long-range scenarios; ii) establish efficient prices 
for and ensure efficient use of transportation services and commodities; and iii) 
prioritize research and funding.   
 Use #1:  Evaluate the costs of transportation projects, policies, and long-range scenarios.  
In cost-benefit analyses, policy evaluations, and scenario analyses, analysts must 
quantify changes to and impacts of transportation systems. The extent to which a 
generic national social-cost analysis can be of use in the evaluation of specific projects or 
policies depends, of course, on the detail and quality of the social-cost analysis. At a 
minimum, a detailed, original social-cost analysis can be mined as a source of data, 
methods, and models for cost evaluations of specific projects.  Beyond this, if costs are a 
linear function of quantity, and invariant with respect to location, then estimates of 
national total or average cost, which any social-cost analysis will produce, may be used 
to estimate the incremental costs for specific projects, policies, or scenarios5. (Average-
cost estimates are more likely to be useful for long-range, broad-brush scenario analysis 
than for specific project evaluations.) Otherwise, analysts must estimate the actual 
nonlinear cost functions for the project, policy, or scenario at hand.  Our own social-cost 
                                                
4Cost models relate total dollar cost to transportation quantities, such as vehicle-miles of travel, trips, 
vehicles, fuel consumption, highway-miles, or parking spaces, and to non- transportation parameters, 
such as weather or geography. 
 
5The average unit cost is equal to the total cost of the entire system divided by some measure of total use 
(quantity, or output), and so is expressed in terms of  $/vehicle-mile of travel (VMT), $/trip, $/vehicle, 
etc. The marginal or incremental unit cost is the cost of an increment to the total system divided by the 
incremental quantity. Given this,  we may scale our estimate of the total social cost of the entire system to 
an estimate of the cost of an increment to the system only if average unit costs are close to marginal unit 
costs. 
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analysis does develop total-cost models for noise, air pollution, accidents, and a few 
other components of the social cost6.   
 It turns out that most total cost functions for transportation services, 
commodities, and impacts are nonlinear and location-dependent. For example,  the 
nonmonetary costs of air pollution are a nonlinear function of motor-vehicle pollution, 
and congestion delay costs are a nonlinear function of motor-vehicle travel. Both vary 
with time and location.  
 Still, even though most costs of motor-vehicle use are not strictly a continuous 
linear function of quantity, down to the mile or gram or decibel or minute7,  in at least 
some scenarios of relatively large changes in motor-vehicle use the average-cost ratio 
might be a serviceable approximation of the actual long-run 8 marginal ratio of interest. 
For example, our own analysis of the health costs of air pollution, in Report #11, reveals 
that, in most cases, there is not a great difference between the nonlinear dose-response 
functions that we use and a linear dose-response function.  
 Appendix A discusses further the use of social-cost estimates to evaluate the 
costs of transportation projects, policies, and long-range scenarios.  
 Use #2:  Establish efficient prices for and ensure efficient use of  those transportation 
resources or impacts that at present either are not priced but in principle should be (e.g., 
emissions from motor vehicles) or else are “priced” but not efficiently (e.g., roads).  
 An efficient price is equal to marginal cost, which is the slope of the total-cost 
function. Hence, any cost models  in a social-cost analysis in principle may be employed 
to estimate marginal-cost prices. (As mentioned above, we have estimated total-cost 
functions for some of the many cost items in our own social-cost analysis.) Beyond this, 
the average-cost results of a social-cost analysis might give analysts some idea of the 
magnitude of the gap between current prices (which might be zero, as in the case of 
pollution) and theoretically optimal prices, and inform discussions of the types of 
                                                
6Ideally, we would estimate, for every quantity (pollution, VMT, trips, vehicles, parking spaces..), 
functions that relate the social dollar cost to the quantity,  and that include all the parameters that might 
be relevant in any situation, so that we could calculate the social cost of any small, realistic, specific 
change in motor-vehicle use. And in many of the important  cases, we actually have done this: for 
example, we have cost/quantity functions for noise, air pollution, accidents, and some government 
services. These total cost functions, in which a cost such as air pollution is a continuous, often nonlinear 
function  of an “output” such as emissions, can be used directly to estimate the cost of any size change in 
the output.  In some other cases (e.g., the cost of home garages), we have provided an estimate of 
marginal rates where we know them to be different from average rates. In many other cases, though, we 
did not estimate total cost functions or total costs based on marginal rates, mainly because we did not 
have the resources to do so. 
 
7Strictly speaking, only the  private running costs of motor-vehicle use -- gasoline, oil, tires, and engine 
wear --  are continuous, immediate, approximately linear functions of mileage.  
 
8I emphasize “long run” because in some cases average cost exceeds marginal cost in the short run.  In 
the short run, lagged costs and fixed costs are not foregone.  Consider, for example, the effects on 
highway-patrol costs of a small reduction in motor-vehicle traffic. If the reduction in travel is very small, 
it is likely that nobody will notice. Even if public officials notice, they might not care. Even if they care, it 
will take them a while to act, through the budgetary and political process. And even when they act, they 
probably will not be able to recover immediately some sunk (but now under-used) capital and 
infrastructure (some capital can be sold off or converted to other uses immediately, but some can not). 
Thus, even though one might calculate an overall average  cost of the highway patrol $X/VMT/year, one 
cannot expect to save $X if VMT is reduced by one mile in a year. 
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policies that might narrow the gap and induce people to use transportation resources 
more efficiently. And to the extent that total-cost functions for the pricing problem at 
hand are thought to be similar to any simple linear national cost functions of a social-
cost analysis, the average-cost results of the national social-cost analysis may be used to 
approximate prices for the problem at hand.   
 Use #3:  Prioritize efforts  to reduce the costs or increase the benefits of 
transportation. The total-cost or average-cost results of a social-cost analysis can help 
analysts and policymakers rank costs (is road dust more damaging than ozone?), track 
costs over time (is the cost of air pollution going down?), and compare the costs of 
pollution control with the benefits of control (are expenditures on motor-vehicle 
pollution control devices greater or less than the value of the pollution eliminated?). 
This information can help people decide how to fund research and development to 
improve the performance and reduce the costs of transportation. For example, if one is 
considering funding research into the sources, effects, and mitigation of pollution, it 
might be useful to know that road-dust particulate matter might be an order of 
magnitude more costly than is ozone attributable to motor vehicles.  
  I present our analysis and estimates with these relatively modest purposes in 
mind9, not to promote a particular policy agenda regarding the use of motor vehicles, 
and certainly not to forward any particular position about what, for example,  gasoline 
taxes “should be”, or whether the nation should invest more or less in motor-vehicle 
use than it is now.          
 
1.2.2  The context 
 Interest in full social-cost accounting and socially efficient pricing has developed 
relatively recently. From the 1920s to the 1960s, major decisions about building and 
financing highways were left to “technical experts,” chiefly engineers, who rarely if ever 
performed social cost-benefit analyses. Starting in the late 1960s, however, “a growing  
awareness of the human and environmental costs of roads, dams, and other 
infrastructure projects brought the public’s faith in experts to an end” (Gifford, 1993, p. 
41).  It was a short step from awareness to quantification of the costs not normally 
included in the narrow financial calculations of the technical experts of the past.   
 Today, the call for full-social-cost accounting and efficient pricing is being 
sounded in many sectors of the economy, from transportation to the chemical industry 
(e.g., Popoff and Buzzelli, 1993). In transportation, discussions of efficient pricing and 
full-social cost accounting now are routine.  For example, in a recent summary of views 
on high-speed ground transportation in the U. S., two of the four authors suggest that 
the cost of high-speed rail (HSR) should be compared with the full, unsubsidized costs 
of the alternatives, including auto and air travel (Stopher, 1993; Thompson, 1993).  
 Not surprisingly, however, there is little agreement about the proper items in a 
social-cost analysis, the magnitude of the major components of the social cost, or the 
extent to which present prices are not optimal. On the one hand, many recent analyses  
argue that the “unpaid” or external costs of motor-vehicle use are quite large -- perhaps 
hundreds of billions of dollars per year -- and hence that automobile use is heavily 
                                                
9To this list one perhaps might add a fourth: simply to know what the costs are now and were in the past.  
However, this is an additional purpose only if the knowledge is valued intrinsically, and not 
instrumentally. If the knowledge is valued instrumentally, then its use must be one of the three described 
above.  
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“subsidized” and underpriced (e.g., MacKenzie et al., 1992; Miller and Moffet, 1993; 
Behrens et al., 1992; California Energy Commission, 1994;  Apogee Research, 1993; 
COWIconsult, 1991; KPMG Peat Marwick Stevenson & Kellog, 1993; Ketcham and 
Komanoff , 1992; Litman, 1994). But, not unexpectedly, others have argued that this is 
not true. For example, the National Research Council (NRC), in its review and analysis 
of automotive fuel economy, claims that “some economists argue that the societal costs 
of the ‘externalities’ associated with the use of gasoline (e.g., national security and 
environmental impacts) are reflected in the price and that no additional efforts to 
reduce automotive fuel consumption are warranted” (NRC, 1992, p. 25). In support of 
this, the NRC cites the following statement by Michael Boskin, chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors at the time (July 10, 1991):  
“With respect to the price of gasoline, the issue is really what the difference is between 
social cost and private cost. We already have a substantial amount of taxation at the 
Federal and State levels and there will be phased in increases in the Federal gasoline 
taxes...The Administration has no belief that externalities or social premiums that ought 
to be paid go beyond what’s already on the books and scheduled to be implemented over 
the next year or so” (in NRC, 1992, p. 25)10.  
 Green (1995) makes essentially the same argument. Beshers (1994) makes the 
narrower claim that road-user tax and fee payments at least equal government 
expenditures related to motor-vehicle use. Similarly, in a November 1992 election in 
California, supporters of a proposition that would have prevented the State of 
California from charging tolls on toll roads after 35 years argued that the tolls would be 
superfluous because “gas taxes are set at a level to pay for needed improvements -- but 
no higher” (Lockyer and Hill, 1992, p. 19). Opponents countered that “subsidies to the 
automobile total $300 billion in the United States every year. Less than two-thirds of the 
cost of our federal highway system is paid for by user fees such as gas taxes...Highway 
users should have to pay for the cost of building, operating, and maintaining the 
highways” (Thompson and Tomlach, 1992, p. 19).  But Dougher (1995) actually argues 
that road-user payments exceed related government outlays by a comfortable margin.  
 I could cite other examples. This extraordinary disagreement exists because of 
the wide range of conceptual frameworks, methods, data, and assumptions. Although 
there are detailed, original, and conceptually correct analyses of individual cost items 
(e.g.,  air pollution [Small and Kazimi, 1995; Krupnick et al., 1997], and accidents [Miller 
et al., 1991]), analyses of costs in particular localities in the U. S. (e.g., Apogee Research, 
1994); original and conceptually correct analyses of the external costs of transport in 
Europe [e.g., Mayeres et al. [1996]), and detailed but old analyses of the social costs of 
transportation in the U. S. (e.g., Keeler et al. [1975]), nobody has done a detailed, up-to-
date, conceptually sound analysis of all of the major costs in the U.S. With few 
exceptions, the recent estimates in the current literature are based on literature reviews, 
often studies that are relatively old, or superficial, or of limited applicability. Moreover, 
some of the current work is confused about the meaning of “externality,” “opportunity 
cost,” and other economic concepts. As a result, the current literature is of limited use to 
policymakers and analysts.  
                                                
10It is doubtful that Boskin or any one else in the Bush Administration could have backed this obviously 
ideological belief with good analysis -- mainly because the belief most likely is false. 
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 In light of this, my colleagues and I set out to do original, methodologically 
sound estimates of many of the major components of the total social cost of motor-
vehicle use. We devoted considerable effort to developing a conceptually coherent 
framework, gathering the best primary data, and using appropriate analytical methods.  
   
 
1.3   THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.3.1  The annualized cost of motor-vehicle use in the U.S. 
When I speak of the social cost of motor-vehicle use, I mean the annualized social 
cost of motor vehicle use in the U.S. based on 1990-1991 cost levels 11.  The annualized cost of 
motor-vehicle use, based on 1990-1991 data, is equal to the sum of:  
 
•  1990-1991 periodic or “operating” costs, such as fuel, vehicle 
maintenance, highway maintenance, salaries of police officers, travel-
time, noise, injuries from accidents, and disease from air pollution; plus  
•  the 1990-91 replacement value of all capital, such as highways, parking 
lots, and residential garages (i.e., tems that provide a stream of 
services), converted into an equivalent stream of annual costs 
(annualized) over the life of the capital, on the basis of real discount 
rates12.   
This annualization method -- whereby the total yearly cost is equal to periodic 
“operations and maintenance costs” plus annualized capital replacement costs -- is just 
                                                
11Originally I conceived of this project as “the social cost of motor-vehicle use in 1990-1991,” rather than 
as “the annualized social cost of motor-vehicle use, based on 1990-1991 data”. It turns out, however, that 
it is not straightforward to define what one means exactly by the “social cost of motor-vehicle use in 1990-
1991,” and that the most logical definition of this is too unusual analytically to be useful.  In Report # 2, I 
discuss several frameworks for estimating the social cost of motor-vehicle use, and explain why I did not 
frame my analysis as “the social cost of  motor-vehicle use in 1990-1991”. 
 
12We use a real (inflation-free) interest rate to amortize capital costs because we want to have the results 
in terms of 1990-1991 prices. If we had used a nominal (with-inflation) interest rate to amortize capital, 
then we would have had to have inflated the periodic costs (operation and maintenance costs) to future 
levels, in accordance with the inflation expectations incorporated into a nominal interest rate.  This is 
because the periodic costs and the amortized capital costs must be in the same terms: either  1990-91 
prices, or 1990-91 prices inflated. It is simpler to use a real interest rate, and keep the analysis in terms of 
1990-91 prices, than to have to inflate current 1990-91 periodic prices in order to have the analysis in 
terms of inflated prices.  
 There is a complication, however. Technically, if we use a real interest rate to amortize capital 
costs, then  we should not estimate any 1990-91 costs on the basis of observed 1990-91 prices, because 
those prices included a nominal  (rather than a real) interest component. Consider, for example, the price 
of gasoline. A part of the price of gasoline is the cost of refining; a part of the cost of refining is amortized 
capital cost; a part of amortized capital cost is interest cost, determined by the nominal interest rate; and a 
part of the nominal interest rate is the expected inflation rate.  Thus, when we calculate the cost of 
gasoline on the basis of 1990-91 prices, we incorporate a nominal-interest-rate component. Strictly 
speaking, this is inconsistent with the use of a real interest rate to amortize 1990-91 capital value. 
However, to estimate real 1990 costs, on the basis of a real interest rate, we would have had to 
disentangle the interest component of every 1990 cost (such as gasoline), and then recalculate the cost 
using an inflation-free interest rate. We did not do this.   
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the obverse of evaluating the net present value of alternative investment options (in 
transportation or any other arena). In essence, the yearly social-cost of motor vehicle 
use, as we estimate it, is the yearly cost stream of the whole motor-vehicle system, 
analyzed as if it were one large transportation alternative among several. Of course, the 
scale that we have chosen -- all motor-vehicle use -- is just a convenient point of 
reference. (That is, one just as well could view the analysis presented here as an analysis 
of a generic motor-vehicle-use project, or alternative, scaled up to the level of all motor 
vehicle use in the U. S.) 
In any event, there is no coherent alternative to the annualization (or net-present-
value) approach to estimating the social cost. Either one performs a social-cost analysis 
as a project evaluation, or one doesn’t have a well-defined analysis13. If (somehow) we 
fail to amortize capital costs, or do so incorrectly, or in general don’t treat capital and 
operating costs in an economically consistent fashion, we will not have economically 
meaningful results, and might then incorrectly evaluate alternatives or mis-price goods 
and services. Although these concepts are quite elementary, in practice it can be easy to 
lose sight of them, and misapply widely used data, such as the FHWA data on capital 
expenditures (see the discussion in Report #2).  
 
1.3.2  What counts as a cost of motor-vehicle use or infrastructure?  
In economic analysis, “cost” means “opportunity cost”. The opportunity cost of 
action A  is the opportunity you forego -- what you give up, or use, or consume as a 
result of doing A. For some resource R to count as a cost of motor-vehicle use, it must be 
true that a change in motor-vehicle use will result in a change in use of R. Thus, gasoline 
is cost of motor-vehicle use because a change in motor-vehicle use will result in a 
change in gasoline use, all else being equal. But general spending on health and 
education is not a cost of motor-vehicle use because a change in motor-vehicle use will 
not result in a change in resources devoted to health or education. 
However, for the purposes of planning, evaluating, or pricing, we care not only 
whether something is a cost of motor-vehicle use, but, if it is a cost, exactly how it is 
related to motor-vehicle use. For example, pollution is a direct, immediate cost of 
motor-vehicle use: you change motor-vehicle use a little, and you immediately change 
pollution a little. But defense expenditures in the Persian Gulf, if they are a cost of 
motor-vehicle use at all, are an indirect, long-term, and tenuous one.  This is discussed 
more below.  
 
1.3.3  How to interpret “the cost of all motor-vehicle use in the U.S.”   
If one wishes to apply the estimates of the total cost of all motor-vehicle use, or to 
understand the basis for deciding what is included in our list of costs in Table 1-1, then 
one might ask what is meant by the cost of all motor-vehicle use: all motor-vehicle use 
compared to what?  
In normal cost-benefit analysis of transportation projects, one estimates costs and 
benefits relative to a well defined “no-project” alternative, or base case. For example, 
one might compare a highway-expansion project with a light-rail project relative to a 
base case of “business as usual” improvement in the management of the existing 
                                                
13One can estimate the net present value rather than the annualized cost of a project, but these are 
economically equivalent methods.  
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infrastructure14. But if the “project” is all motor-vehicle use, what is the base case -- the 
world without motor-vehicle use?  
 In this analysis, the world without motor-vehicle use is presumed to be the same 
as the world with motor-vehicle use, except  that in the former people don’t use motor-
vehicles. This means that the benefits of motor-vehicle use -- the access provided -- are 
presumed to be the same in both worlds. Put another way, the total social cost of motor-
vehicle use is the welfare difference between the present (ca. 1991) motor-vehicle 
system, and a system that provides exactly the same services (that is, moves people and 
goods too and from the same places as do motor vehicles) but without time, manpower, 
materials, or energy -- in short, without cost15.  
This costless transportation baseline is just a frame of reference, a conceptual 
baseline with respect to which total costs trends can be estimated, or the total costs of 
one system (say, passenger vehicles) compared with the costs of another (say, passenger 
trains).  Moreover, it is relevant only to understanding the meaning of the total cost 
estimates themselves; it is not relevant if one is interested specifically in the data, 
methods, and marginal-cost models of the social-cost analysis, for the purpose of 
estimating efficient prices (say, for motor-vehicle emissions), or doing cost-benefit 
analysis of specific projects.  
This last point, obvious though it may be, probably cannot be overemphasized. If 
one is interested in, say, establishing Pigovian taxes to internalize the damages from 
motor-vehicle emissions, then one probably will wish to examine the details of the 
damage-function model that produces estimates of the $/kg cost of emissions, as a 
function of the change in emissions. One will not care about our estimate of the total 
dollar damages due to air pollution from motor-vehicles in 1990. Thus, insofar as one is 
interested in the details of our analysis, and not in the total-cost estimates themselves, 
the question “total cost compared to what?” never arises. 
                                                
14Of course, one must be more specific about the base case than this, because the estimated costs and 
benefits will depend greatly on the details. A day-time parking-management plant that reduces VMT by 
10% will result in costs and benefits quite different from those of, say, a congestion pricing scheme on a 
toll bridge that also reduces VMT by 10%.  
 
15Of course, if there were a costless transportation system, people would make more and longer trips, 
and settlement would be more dispersed. Conceptually, I ignore this effect in the baseline “no-motor-
vehicle” case. 
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1.3.4 Benefits versus costs  
 In this project, we estimate the dollar social cost but not the dollar social benefit 
of motor-vehicle use. More precisely, we identify, classify, and quantify many of the 
impacts and resources of motor-vehicle use16. The social cost of motor-vehicle use is the 
value of the resources devoted to motor-vehicle use. (In this context, “resources” should 
be broadly construed to include health, esthetic, environmental, and similar impacts of 
motor-vehicle use.)  In Figure 1-1, the total social cost is the area under the social supply 
curve, S* (region O-x*-Q* if we are at the social optimum, with all externalities 
internalized; region O-x’-Q if we are at the private market optimum, with external costs 
extant).  
 The social benefit of motor-vehicle use is the value that beneficiaries ascribe to 
motor-vehicle use -- in economic parlance, the total “willingness to pay” for motor-
vehicle use. Total willingness to pay is the area under the demand curve, D, of Figure 1-
1 (region O-A-x*-Q*). The difference between the total benefit and the total cost, region 
O-A-x* of Figure 1-1, is the net benefit of motor vehicle use. (The net benefit can be 
negative, of course.) Net social benefit, or the ratio of social benefit to social cost, is the 
ultimate measure of economic worth. In cost-benefit analysis, the preferred package of 
policies or investments is the one that generates the highest net benefits for the available 
budget17.  
Again, ours is a cost analysis, not a cost-benefit analysis. Of course, we have not 
forgotten that there are benefits of motor-vehicle use18, and certainly have not 
presumed that the benefits somehow are less important than the costs. To the contrary, 
as I discuss in Report #20, it is obvious that motor-vehicle use is enormously beneficial, 
and that its total social benefit vastly exceeds its cost19. The problem is that, although it 
is possible to estimate the benefits of small changes in motor-vehicle use, it is very 
difficult to estimate credibly the benefits of all motor-vehicle use. The root of the 
problem is that we do not know what the total demand curve looks like near zero 
quantity: trips by car for which there are no good substitutes must be extremely 
valuable, but precisely how valuable we don’t know.   Because this is a cost analysis 
only, we are unable to say much about net dollar benefits or cost-benefit ratios, or 
whether a particular transportation system or plan is worthwhile, or better or worse 
than another system or plan.  For example, this analysis indicates that motor-vehicle use 
might cost us more than people realize; that is, that the total social cost appreciably 
exceeds the commonly recognized private cost. But even if this is so, it does not mean 
that motor-vehicle use costs society more than it is worth, or that we should prefer any 
transportation option that might have near-zero external costs, or even any 
                                                
16We hope that we have at least identified virtually all of the costs of motor-vehicle use.  
 
17For a general review of cost-benefit analysis, see Mishan (1976). For a recent discussion of some of the 
more problematic aspects of cost-benefit analysis, including valuation of non-market goods, ecosystem 
complexity, the social rate of discount, irreversibilities, and efficiency versus equity, see Hanley (1992). 
 
18Social-cost analysts sometimes are accused of ignoring or dismissing the benefits of motor-vehicle use 
(e.g., Green, 1995;Science News , June, 1993) . 
 
19Moreover, it is worth noting that in some places automobiles are more environmentally benign than the 
transportation modes (e.g., horse-drawn carriages) that they have replaced (Button, 1993).  
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transportation option that might have lower total social costs. To make such choices, 
one must estimate the dollar value of all the benefits as well as the dollar value of all the 
costs,  for all of the relevant policies or investment alternatives. 
 
1.3.5  Some minor conceptual issues.  
 There are other minor conceptual issues worth mentioning.  One is that the 
cost/quantity function for increases in motor-vehicle use might be different than for 
decreases. Another is that for some of the government services (say, police protection) 
that support motor-vehicle use, long-run cost might be a non-linear function of some 
measure of cost-related activity (say, crimes or arrests). In the extreme, cost might be a 
step-function of activity, such that over some range of activity, the cost of changes in 
activity might be zero. But one should be careful here, because many small changes in 
activity, each change by itself not large enough to reach the next cost step, may together 
create enough additional use to reach the next cost step. Put another way, the problem 
with assuming that any particular change does not have a cost is that, in the absence of 
information to the contrary, the starting point for any change is just as likely to be very 
close to the next cost step as very far, which means that it is just as likely that an 
infinitesimal change in use will occasion the entire cost of the step as a much bigger 
change in use will occasion no cost at all. To avoid this mistake, an analyst should treat 
a step function as a continuous function, which is tantamount to using average cost as a 
proxy for marginal cost over the relevant range. This is an advantage of an average-cost 
analysis. 
 
1.3.6  Classification of components of the total social cost 
 There are many  components of the social cost of motor vehicles use, and one 
naturally has the urge to classify them. But should these components be classified or 
organized in any particular way? It seems sensible to organize cost components in 
consonance with how the cost estimates will be used. Thus, if one were interested only  
in estimating the total social cost of motor-vehicle use, and did not care at all about how 
the estimates might be used, then actually one would not need to categorize the 
components of the social cost. One would just estimate and perhaps add up every 
component of the social cost. This, however, would not be of much use to anybody. 
  As discussed above, estimates of total social cost of motor-vehicle use 
legitimately can be used for three purposes:  i) to evaluate the costs of transportation 
projects, policies, and long-range scenarios; ii) to establish efficient prices for and ensure 
efficient use of transportation services and commodities; and iii) to prioritize research 
and funding.  Of these uses, only the second one, efficiency of use , comes with a set of 
principle and conditions -- namely, the conditions of efficient resource use -- that can be 
used to categorize costs. Consequently, if one wishes one’s social-cost estimates to be 
useful to policymakers who want improve the efficiency of the use of the transportation 
system20, then one should categorize and analyze cost items with respect to the 
economic efficiency of their production or consumption. I have done so here.  
                                                
20I recognize, of course, that policy makers rarely if ever are concerned solely with maximizing economic 
efficiency or social net welfare, and often seem utterly unconcerned about it. Unquestionably, matters of 
distribution -- who gets what, who wins and who loses -- loom larger in the political arena. I leave out 
such distributional issues not because they are unimportant, but because efficiency is an interesting 
enough topic itself, and easily distinguished conceptually from equity.  
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 In Table 1-1, I also use other organizing criteria, such as whether or not a cost is 
valued in dollars (this is discussed more below), and end up with six categories of costs. 
Of course, one could come up with other classifications, even using the same general 
organizing principles. One could, for example, merge or split some of my categories.   
 Classification with respect to the efficiency condition marginal social value 
equals price equals marginal social cost.  Resources are used efficiently when the 
marginal value to society (MSV) equals the market price (P) equals marginal cost to 
society (MSC). However, most real markets do not allocate resources efficiently, 
according to MSV = P = MSC, because at a minimum most production and 
consumption involves some sort of externality, and most prices are influenced by 
distortionary (non-optimal) taxes.  In fact, there are a variety of reasons that a market 
might not allocate resources optimally, or what is worse, why no private market might 
exist. These reasons -- the reasons for inefficiencies -- are a natural organizing principle for a 
social-cost analysis, because there are prescriptions for every kind of inefficiency.  To organize 
costs with respect to efficiency or inefficiency of allocation is tantamount to organizing 
costs with respect to prescriptions for maximizing efficiency. This is useful to 
policymakers. 
 In Appendix B, I review the conditions required for markets to exist and allocate 
resources efficiently, and what happens if the conditions are not met. Here, I emphasize 
an important general point. It is generally true that, for  society to use resources 
efficiently, each individual who makes a resource-use decision must count  as a cost of 
that use everything that in fact is an opportunity cost from the standpoint of society. It 
does not matter whether or not  motor-vehicle users as a class pay for a particular cost 
generated “within” the class; what matters is whether or not each individual decision 
maker recognizes and pays the relevant social marginal-cost prices. If the responsible 
individual decision maker does not account for the cost, it does not matter then who 
actually pays for it, fellow user or non-user; the resource [usually] is misallocated, 
regardless of who pays.    
 To account for a cost, a consumer must know its magnitude and be required or 
feel obliged to bear it. Generally, a  price accomplishes both of these things: it tells the 
consumer what he must give up in order to consume the item21.   
 This emphasis on price, and on individual resource-use decisions, keeps the 
analysis properly focused on economic efficiency. In an analysis of efficiency, one must 
not think of motor-vehicle users as a class, and imagine that the distinction between 
users and non-users as a class is relevant. It is not. The class distinction may be relevant 
to questions of equity, but it certainly is not relevant to questions of efficiency22.  
                                                
21Although a market price on an item is sufficient to make a consumer account for the item in his 
decision making, in principle it is not necessary. What is necessary is that one way or another the 
consumer know and bear the cost. A cost can be “borne” abstractly, as, for example, a feeling of guilt. 
Thus, in principle, pollution could be satisfactorily accounted for in consumer decisions if everyone knew 
all the costs of pollution and cared enough to act as though they paid the costs in dollars.  
 
22Indeed, thinking in terms of classes often will lead one to the wrong answer.  For example, it might 
seem at first glance that because congestion costs are “internal” to -- borne entirely by -- motor-vehicle 
users as a class, there is no imperative to do address them. However, when one person slows down 
another and does not account for the imposed delay, the resulting congestion, or delay, is an externality, 
and hence a source of economic inefficiency.  In an analysis of efficiency, it does not matter that in this 
case motor-vehicle users as a class might bear all of the consequences; the point is that if there is a delay 
externality, then the motor-vehicle users themselves are using  their motor vehicles inefficiently, and can 
improve their total welfare if each person has to account for his or her effect on the travel time of others. 
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 A methodological organizing criterion.  I have included in Table 1-1 a 
classificatory criterion that has to do not with economic efficiency, but rather with 
methods of estimating costs: “monetary” versus “nonmonetary” costs. The distinction 
here is not between cost items that “ought” to be valued in dollars and costs that ought 
not, nor between efficiently and inefficiently priced items, but rather between cost items 
that are traded in real markets and hence valued directly in dollars, and items that are 
not.    
  Although this distinction is not directly relevant to efficiency of resource use, it 
is relevant to the practical estimation of social cost. Abstractly, the social cost of any 
item X (tires, roads, disturbance by noise, suffering from asthma caused by air 
pollution...) is equal to the quantity of X (number of tires, miles of roads, excess decibels 
of exposure, days of suffering asthma) multiplied by the unit cost of X ($/tire, $/road-
mile, $/excess decibel, $/day of suffering). In Table 1-1, the distinction between 
“monetary” and “nonmonetary” costs pertains to the estimation of the $/unit part of 
the calculation of social costs. An item is classified as a “monetary” cost if we can 
observe or estimate its $/unit cost (or value) directly from market transactions. Thus, 
because we can observe the $/unit cost of tires, and the $/mile cost of building roads, 
tires and roads are classified as monetary costs. By contrast, we cannot observe directly 
the unit cost of noise or air pollution ($/decibel, or $/day of suffering), because noise 
disturbance and suffering per se are not traded and valued in markets23.   
 The distinction is methodologically important because (obviously) it is much 
more difficult to estimate the $/unit cost of nonmonetary items than of monetary 
items24. Although economists have a variety of  techniques (e.g., hedonic-price analysis 
and stated-preference analysis) to estimate the $/unit costs of (or demand curves for) 
nonmonetary items, all of the techniques can be problematic, and as a result the social 
                                                                                                                                                       
To maximize the net social benefits of motor-vehicle use we must eliminate all externalities, not just those 
that affect the class of “non users” (however defined).   
 
23However, protective or ameliorative measures, such as ear plugs or asthma medicine, often are valued 
in markets. Ideally, one would distinguish these as monetary externalities. Moreover, the entire cost of 
crop loss due to motor-vehicle air pollution, which I have classified as a nonmonetary cost, actually is a 
market cost, and hence should be classified as a monetary externality.  However, not only is it difficult in 
most cases to quantify the monetary-cost components of air-pollution and noise, it seems more natural to 
classify all of the costs of pollution in one place, as non-monetary externalities. And in any event, failure 
to distinguish all monetary costs does not undermine the classification  with respect to economic 
efficiency, because from the perspective of efficient resource allocation and proper pricing there is little 
difference between a monetary externality and a non-monetary externality. 
 Why then bother to distinguish monetary from non-monetary externalities at all? One reason, 
explained in the text, is that non-monetary externalities usually are harder to estimate and more 
uncertain. A second reason is that some public-sector infrastructure and service costs can be considered 
to be monetary externalities, and hence to straddle the public-sector and the monetary-externality 
categories. If we do not distinguish monetary from non-monetary externalities, then some of the public 
infrastructure and service costs, such as fire protection, will straddle the category that includes 
environmental externalities, such as global warming. This seems too much of a stretch; it is better to 
separate public-sector costs from environmental externalities by having an intermediate category called 
“monetary externalities”.  
 
24It also may be that monetary costs are more significant  politically because they are more tangible 
economically.  
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nonmonetary costs of motor-vehicle use often are very uncertain -- typically, much 
more uncertain than are the monetary costs25.    
 Other conceptual and methodological issues are explored in more detail in 
Report #2 of this social-cost series (see the list at the beginning of this report). I turn 
now to the six general cost categories of Table 1-1.  
 
 
1.4  COMPONENTS OF THE SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE 
 
1.4.1  Column 1 of Table 1-1: Personal nonmonetary costs of motor-vehicle use.  
 Personal nonmonetary costs are those unpriced costs of motor-vehicle use that a 
person imposes on herself as a result of her decision to travel. The largest personal costs 
of motor-vehicle use are personal travel time in uncongested conditions, and the risk of 
getting into an accident that (loosely speaking) involves nobody else. 
 Note the distinction between personal nonmonetary costs (column 1) and 
externalities of the same sort (column 6). Personal costs are caused and borne by the 
same party, whereas externalities are imposed by one party on another but not 
accounted for by the imposing party. The [expected value of the] risk that I will cause 
an accident and injure myself is a personal nonmonetary cost; the risk that someone else 
will injure me is an external risk, if the other person does not account for it. The 
congestion delay that others impose on me is an external cost; the rest of my travel time 
is a personal nonmonetary cost. These distinctions are  relevant to policy making 
because personal costs are unpriced26 but efficiently allocated if consumers are 
informed and rational, whereas externalities are unpriced and inevitably a source of 
inefficiency27. As discussed below and indicated in Table 1-2, the usual prescription for 
externalities is a Pigovian28 tax, whereas the “prescription” for a personal cost (whether 
caused by the affected party or not) is just that the affected party be fully aware of it. 
Thus, any individual should be charged for the accident or travel time costs he imposes 
on others, and be fully aware of the costs that he himself faces as a result of using a 
motor-vehicle.  
  If an individual does not correctly assess the personal costs to himself, then he 
will consume more or less than he would have had he been fully informed and rational. 
For example, there is evidence that most drivers overestimate their alertness and 
                                                
25Of course, some monetary costs also are difficult to estimate and very uncertain. An example is the 
GNP loss due to a sudden change in the price of oil.  
 
26Explicit prices, which  mediate transactions between buyers and seller, obviously are not necessary if 
the  “buyer” and “seller” are one and the same -- that is, if there is no exchange, or no market, as in the 
case of personal nonmonetary costs. Thus, the absence of an explicit price is not relevant.  (One might say 
that personal costs are implicitly or “internally” priced by travelers.)  
 
27I recognize, though, that the distinction between personal nonmonetary costs and nonmonetary 
externalities is awkward to the extent that it is not realistic psychologically.  In reality, if a motor-vehicle 
user accounts for, say, exposure to noise and the risk of an accident, she does not necessarily distinguish 
between the noise or risk that she is responsible for and the noise and risk imposed by others. Rather, she 
probably makes a qualitative judgment about overall exposure to noise and risk.   
 
28Named after the English economist A. C. Pigou, who made significant contributions to the economic 
analysis of social welfare.  
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driving skill, and underestimate their chances of getting into an accident (DeJoy, 1989). 
To the extent that they do, they underestimate the expected personal cost of driving, 
and make more trips, or more risky trips, then they would if they were properly 
apprised of their abilities and chances.  
 Report #2 in this series contains further discussion of the classification and 
interpretation of personal nonmonetary costs. In that report, I note that it is more 
sensible to classify the costs of drunk driving and motor-vehicle crime not as external 
costs within a framework of economic efficiency, but as costs of immoral and illegal 
behavior, within a broader framework that classifies costs by non-efficiency as well as 
efficiency concerns.  
 Personal nonmonetary costs are estimated in Report #4 of this social-cost series. 
Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the concepts, data, and 
estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column.  
 
1.4.2  Column 2 of Table 1-1:  Motor-vehicle goods and services priced in the private 
sector (estimated net of producer surplus and taxes and fees).  
 The economic cost of motor-vehicle goods and services supplied in private 
markets is the area under the private supply curve: the value of the resources that a 
private market allocates to supplying vehicles, fuel, parts, insurance, and so on.  
 However, we do not observe the supply curve itself, and so cannot estimate the 
area under the supply curve directly. Rather, we must estimate this area indirectly, 
starting from what we can observe: total price-times-quantity revenues.  Thus, the 
private-sector resource cost under the supply curve is equal to price-times-quantity 
revenues minus producer surplus and taxes and fees. We deduct producer surplus29 
because it is defined as revenue in excess of economic cost, and hence is a non-cost 
wealth transfer from consumers to producers30. We deduct taxes and fees  assessed on 
producers and consumers because in no case are they marginal-cost prices that can be 
used in a price-times-revenue calculation of costs31.  
 Note that this is not merely theoretical twaddle: it bears directly on comparisons 
of alternatives. For example, in comparing the cost of oil with the cost of alternative 
energy sources, it will not do to count all price-times-quantity oil revenues as the cost, 
                                                
29In most cases, we do not have good data on producer surplus, and simply estimate it as a fraction of 
price-times-quantity revenues. Often, our estimate of this fraction is little more than our educated guess.  
 
30However, a net (equilibrium) transfer from U.S. consumers to foreign producers is a real cost to the U.S.  
 
31Recall that the point here is to estimate private-sector resource cost. The cost of the private-sector 
resources devoted to, say, making gasoline, does not include the federal and state gasoline tax, because 
that tax is a charge for the use of the roads, not part of the marginal-cost price of making gasoline. But 
why not then use the gasoline tax as an estimate of the cost of the roads, just as one uses price-times-
quantity payments (less producer surplus) to estimate private-sector resource cost? There are two 
reasons. First, we have data on expenditures on road construction and maintenance anyway, and so do 
not need to use price-times-quantity to approximate cost.  
 Second, even if we did want to use price-times-quantity to approximate the infrastructure cost, 
we would not treat the gasoline tax as a price, because it is not a marginal-cost price, but rather is a 
charge that bears no obvious resemblance to an efficient price. We can use price-times-quantity data to 
estimate cost (the area under the supply curve) only if we know the relationship between price and cost. 
Because we do not know the relationship between the gasoline tax and cost, gasoline tax data are useless 
information in an analysis of cost.  
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because the true private resource cost is much less than this, on account of the 
enormous producer surplus that accrues to some oil producers. 
 The prices and quantities that obtain in private markets rarely are optimal -- that 
is, the actual prices (P) paid rarely satisfy MSV = P = MSC -- not only because of 
distortionary taxes and fees, but because of imperfect competition, standards and 
regulations that affect production and consumption, price controls, subsidies, quotas, 
externalities, and poor information. For example, the market for crude oil is not always 
competitive.  The reason, of course, is that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) sometimes manages to restrict oil output and thereby raise oil price 
above marginal cost. This is inefficient from the standpoint of the world because it cuts 
off production of oil that could be produced for less than the [formerly] prevailing 
market price and hence from a social-efficiency standpoint should be produced and 
consumed32 (see Figure 1-B2). One also can argue that other industries, such as the 
automobile manufacturing industry, at times look oligopolistic33.  
 Standards and regulations also can be economically inefficient. For example, the 
cost of vehicles and fuels includes items, such as catalytic converters and airbags and 
perhaps lightweight materials, used to meet government standards for emissions, 
safety, and fuel economy. Now, if the government standards are not the most efficient 
corrective, then the corresponding resources (for catalytic converters, air bags, etc.) are 
not efficiently allocated. Of course, it is well known that, transaction costs and 
uncertainty aside (and these admittedly are big asides), Pigovian taxes indeed are more 
efficient than are standards. However, Pigovian taxes can be more expensive to 
administer, less predictable, and more difficult to change on short notice, to the point 
that standards might be preferable in some and perhaps many situations (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988). It thus is not necessarily always the case that in the real world standards 
and regulations are less efficient than Pigovian regulations34.  
 Finally, consumers can be ignorant and irrational. For example, some and 
perhaps many people routinely underestimate the probability that they will be in an 
accident, and as a result undervalue safety equipment in motor vehicles. 
                                                
32This also results in an increased transfer of wealth from consumers to producers (who are receiving a 
price above their marginal cost), and can be a real loss to heavy oil importers like the U.S. Note, though, 
that this extra wealth transfer is not in addition to price-times-quantity payments; to the contrary it 
already is part of price-times quantity payments. Rather, the extra wealth transfer is with respect to the 
total transfer in a competitive market (see Greene and Leiby, 1993). The total resource cost of fuel use to 
the U.S., competitive market or not, is equal to price-times-quantity payments less domestic producer 
surplus, which is a non-cost transfer from U.S. consumers to U.S. producers.  
 
33In light of this, one might distinguish those resources provided in [occasionally] non-competitive 
markets, and place them in a separate column labeled “subject to non-competitive pricing: MSV = p ≠ 
MSC”. For simplicity, I have not.  
 
34I emphasize that the question here is not whether the resources used to meet government standards 
should be counted as a cost of motor-vehicle use -- certainly they should be -- but whether they  are 
efficiently allocated. Catalytic converters are a cost of motor-vehicle use today, and barring unforeseen 
changes in regulations, will continue to be a cost of motor-vehicle use,  regardless of whether or not there 
would be catalytic converters in a Pareto-optimal world. Furthermore, regardless of whether standards or 
taxes are used to address an externality, the relevant total cost is the resource cost of whatever control 
measures are used (including “defensive” behavior broadly construed) plus the estimated cost of the 
residual (uncontrolled) effects, such as emissions.  
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 In sum, then, it certainly is not true that all private markets are perfect and 
should be left alone.  Rather, there are a variety of imperfections, in every sector of the 
economy, including the most competitive, unregulated private sectors. As a result, we 
face a range of analytical and policy issues pertaining to pricing, taxation, regulation, 
and so on.  
 The costs of priced private-sector goods and services are estimated in Report #5 
of this social-cost series. Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the 
concepts, data, and estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column. 
 
1.4.3  Column 3 of Table 1-1:  Motor-vehicle goods and services bundled in the 
private sector 
Some of the motor-vehicle goods and services provided in the private sector are 
not priced explicitly , but rather are bundled in the prices of nontransportation goods 
and services. For example, “free” parking at a shopping mall is unpriced, but it is not 
costless; the cost is included -- bundled-- in the price of goods and services sold at the 
mall. Similarly, residential garages are not sold as separate commodities, but rather are 
included in the total price of a home. In the United States, nearly all parking, 
commercial and residential, is bundled. Some local roads also are bundled, usually with 
the cost of a home.  
Parking.  The typical motor vehicle is driven less than one hour every day. The 
rest of the time, it is parked. In the U.S., a considerable amount of resources are devoted 
to providing parking for nearly 200 million vehicles parked for 23 hours a day. As 
estimated in Appendix A of Report #6, parking spaces for vehicles consume on the 
order of   2,000 to 3,000 square miles of land. More importantly, most of the roughly 
$100-billion resource cost of parking is not priced as a separate charge for parking, but 
rather is bundled with other goods, such as items at a shopping center, or a family’s 
home, and priced as a package.   
There are several ways to classify and analyze parking: on street versus offstreet, 
commercial versus residential, publicly versus privately owned and operated, parking 
garage versus parking lot, and more.  In this social-cost series, parking costs are 
classified and estimated as follows:  
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Type of parking space a. Priced b. Unpriced  (bundled) 
i.  on-street parking    
publicly owned Report #7 (included with 
cost of public roads) 
Report #7 (included with 
cost of public roads) 
privately owned Report #5 (assume zero, or 
with private roads) 
Report #6 (private roads) 
ii. off-street loading ramp or 
commercial driveway  
  
publicly owned not estimated not estimated 
privately owned not estimated not estimated 
iii.  unimproved land35   
publicly owned assume zero cost assume zero cost 
privately owned assume zero cost assume zero cost 
iv.  offstreet residential    
publicly owned Report #5 (assume zero 
cost) 
Report #7 (assume zero 
cost) 
privately owned Report #5 Report #6 
v.  offstreet nonresidential    
publicly owned Report #7  Report #7  
privately owned Report #5 Report #6 
 
Bundled private-sector parking costs (i-b, iv-b, and v-b) are classified in column 3 
of Table 1-1, and estimated in Report #6. In that report we develop our estimates in 
detail, with special attention to important and uncertain parameters, such as the 
number of offstreet, non-residential parking spaces, the cost of parking spaces, the 
number of residential garages and parking spaces, the fraction of residential parking 
space actually used by cars, and maintenance and repair expenditures for garages. We 
also discuss the reasons for and efficiency implications of the practice of bundling 
parking.  
Other bundled costs.  Report #6 also presents rough estimates of the cost of local 
roads funded by private parties and included in the price of homes.  
Although there are benefits to unbundling a commodity and pricing it explicitly, 
there also can be costs,  and as a result it is not necessarily true that bundling is 
inefficient. For example, although priced parking generally is supplied and used more 
efficiently than is unpriced (bundled) parking, there is a cost to actually administering a 
pricing system, and this transaction cost may exceed the benefit of more efficient use of 
parking. One must do a complete social cost-benefit analysis, in which transaction costs 
are included, to determine if bundling is superior to pricing. If the decision to bundle 
can be distorted by such things as minimum parking requirements and tax laws that do 
                                                
35The cost of parking in, say, a dirt field is just the foregone stream of rent from alternative uses of the 
land. In areas where such parking occurs, this generally will be small; certainly, it will be small compared 
to the land, capital,  and operating costs of improved parking spaces. 
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not count free parking for employees as a taxable benefit, the ideal solution is to 
eliminate the inefficient taxes and standards, and not necessarily to force parking costs 
to be unbundled. See Report #6, and Gomez-Ibanez (1997) for further discussion.  
 Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the concepts, data, 
and estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column.  
 
1.4.4  Column 4 of Table 1-1: Motor-vehicle infrastructure and services provided by 
the public sector.   
 The public sector provides a wide range of infrastructure and services in support 
of motor-vehicle use. I use data on government expenditures for capital and operations 
and maintenance, and estimates of motor-vehicle-related activity in various cost 
categories (police protection, fire protection, and so on), to estimate the long-run 
annualized capital cost and annual operating and maintenance cost of this motor-
vehicle-related infrastructure and service. I categorize these public-sector costs 
separately because governments, unlike private firms, do not charge efficient prices for 
their goods and services.   
 Note that some cost items straddle columns 4 and 5. In at least one respect, the 
distinction between column 4 and column 5 is somewhat arbitrary: items in column 4 
are priced but not priced efficiently (or as efficiently as is possible), whereas items in 
column 5 are not priced at all.  The distinction is somewhat arbitrary because whether 
there is an inefficient charge or no charge at all, the result is similar: inefficient use of 
resources36. Nevertheless, for several reasons, it is useful and natural to distinguish 
improperly priced from unpriced items. In the first place, analyses of social cost often 
are framed around the distinction between private costs and external costs, wherein 
external costs are unpriced and completely unaccounted for by consumers. Thus, to 
identify pure externalities, one must distinguish unpriced from improperly priced 
items. Second, analysts and policymakers need to know which items are being charged 
for already, but incorrectly, versus which items are not being charged for at all, because 
generally it will be easier to correctly charge for the former group than the latter. Third, 
much of the motor-vehicle-related infrastructure and service provided by the public 
sector is priced, but not efficiently. Thus, if one wants to identify public infrastructure 
and service costs charged at least partly to motor-vehicle users -- and it certainly seems 
natural to do so -- one must distinguish improperly priced from unpriced costs. 
 This distinction does make for a messy classification, though, because it is 
difficult to decide which taxes or fees are payments for which public services. For 
example, as I argue in Report #17, the portion of the motor-fuel tax that is officially 
dedicated to deficit reduction should be counted as a payment by motor-vehicle users 
for motor-vehicle use, regardless of the actual legislative earmarking. But to which 
publicly provided motor-vehicle services does it apply?  Fire protection related to 
motor-vehicle use? Highway construction only? Defense of oil interests? The answer is 
a matter of judgment, and as a result, whether a particular public service is priced 
inefficiently or instead is completely unpriced also is a matter of judgment. I have 
placed in column 4 those public infrastructure and service items that by law are funded 
at least partly by taxes fees on motor-vehicle use.  The rest of the items -- those that are 
not definitely and universally understood to be funded by motor-vehicle users -- 
straddle columns 4 and 5.  
                                                
36Of course, this statement does not apply to pure public goods, for which the optimal price is zero. 
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 Of course, whereas all government expenditures on highways and the highway 
patrol are a cost of motor-vehicle use, only a portion of total government expenditure 
on local police, fire, jails, and so on, is a cost of motor-vehicle use. I have estimated the 
portion of these expenditures that, in the long run anyway, is a cost of motor-vehicle 
use. This sort of allocation is valid for expenditures (such as for police protection) that 
arguably are opportunity costs of motor-vehicle use. (For example, using or having 
motor-vehicle goods, services, and infrastructure has some effect on crime, which 
requires police-protection services.)37  
 Note that our estimates of total public-sector costs include the annualized cost of 
the capital stock. Because capital is foregone (liquidated, not replaced, or not expanded) 
only in the long run, and only as a result decisions by public officials, the costs 
estimated here are long-run costs of public decision making.  
 Government expenditures are estimated in Report #7 of this social-cost series. 
Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the concepts, data, and 
estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column. 
 
1.4.5  Column 5 of Table 1-1: Monetary externalities of motor-vehicle use.  
 An external cost of motor-vehicle use is a cost of motor-vehicle use that is 
imposed on person A by person B but not accounted for by person B. (In section 1.4.6 
we give a more formal definition.) A monetary  external cost is one that happens to be 
valued monetarily by markets, in spite of being unpriced from the perspective of the 
responsible motor-vehicle user. The clearest example, shown in column 5 of Table 1, is 
accident costs that are paid for by those not responsible for the accident. These repair 
costs,  inflicted by uninsured motorists, clearly are unpriced in the first instance -- that 
is, unpriced from the perspective of the uninsured motorist responsible for the accident 
-- but nevertheless are valued explicitly in dollars in private markets. With respect to 
economic efficiency, the concern here is that the costs in this category are not priced at 
all, and hence are larger than is socially optimal. 
The largest monetary externalities are those relating to accidents, travel delay, 
and the macroeconomic costs of oil use.   
 Monetary externalities are estimated in Report #8 of this social-cost series. 
Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the concepts, data, and 
estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column. 
 
1.4.6  Column 6a of Table 1-1: Nonmonetary externalities of motor-vehicle use. 
 I follow Baumol and Oates (1988), and  state that a nonmonetary externality is 
present when agent A chooses the value of [a] nonmonetary variable[s] in agent B’s 
utility or production relationships without considering B’s welfare. Thus, by this 
definition, “externality” is synonymous not with “damage,”  but with “unaccounted for 
                                                
37Another point: for at least three reasons, it is likely that expenditure data do not represent purely 
economic cost (area under the supply curve). First, even if competitive bidding forces each contractor to 
offer no more than his minimum willingness to supply, the amounts that the highway contractors 
themselves pay for materials and services (and which they incorporate into their bids) may include 
producer surplus. Second,  as Lee (1992) notes, “it is possible to argue that kickbacks from corrupt 
contractors and [a portion of] politically inflated labor rates are transfers, not costs” (p. 19; bracketed 
comments mine). Third, to the extent that highway expenditures are financed from incremental tax 
revenues, the economy suffers deadweight losses of consumer and surplus due to the contraction of 
consumption and production caused by price distortion by the incremental taxes.  
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cost”.  A nonmonetary externality is one that is not valued directly by economic 
markets. Environmental pollution, traffic delay, and pain and suffering due to accidents 
are common examples of nonmonetary externalities. 
 Environmental costs include those related to air pollution, global warming, water 
pollution, and noise due to motor vehicles. To estimate these costs, one must model 
complex physical processes and biological responses, and then estimate the dollar value 
of the responses.   
 The economic problem created by externalities is the classic divergence between 
private cost and social cost, discussed above and illustrated in Figure 1-1. As indicated 
in Table 1-2, the usual prescription for nonmonetary externalities is to assign property 
rights, bargain, or apply a dynamic Pigovian tax on the perpetrator or emissions 
source38, with no direct compensation of the victim. The definition, treatment, and 
estimation of external costs is discussed in more detail Report #9 of this social-cost 
series.   
 In this report, I have distinguished nonmonetary externalities, which are 
nonmonetary costs inflicted, even if only indirectly, by motor-vehicle user A on party B 
and not accounted for by A, from personal nonmonetary costs, which are inflicted by a 
motor-vehicle user on herself. I also might have distinguished a third kind of 
nonmonetary or environmental-damage cost: that inflicted by motor-vehicle user A on 
party B  but accounted for by A as a marginal cost of motor-vehicle use. When an 
externality is properly taxed, it becomes this third type of cost. (One perhaps could 
argue that once a [formerly] nonmonetary cost is properly taxed, it becomes a monetary 
cost, but this is merely semantics.) Thus, the third category would consist of true 
Pigovian taxes.  
 However, there are at most only three quasi-Pigovian taxes related to motor-
vehicle use: 1) the portion of the oil-spill environmental excise tax that covers costs 
other than clean-up costs; 2) the tax, which Barthold (1994) says is “Pigovian,” on 
ozone-depleting chemicals; and 3) the gas-guzzler tax, which arguably is partly a tax on 
energy-security costs. However, the oil-spill tax and the gas-guzzler tax probably are 
not equal to marginal expected damages, and hence probably are not true Pigovian 
taxes, and the tax on ozone-depleting chemicals now is largely irrelevant because new 
automobiles use a more ozone-friendly refrigerant that is not subject to the tax.  For 
these reasons, I have not created a separate category called “properly taxed, efficiently 
allocated environmental damages”.  
 Note that, if one were tallying the marginal social cost and found that there were 
optimal Pigovian taxes, one would count either the tax or the value of the actual 
marginal damage, but not both, because if the tax had been calculated correctly it would 
                                                
38The Pigovian tax must be levied on the immediate damaging activity,  and not on some related activity. 
In the case of air pollution, the tax should be levied on the source of the emissions. For example, the 
environmental damages from pollution from petroleum refineries should be internalized by  a tax on 
refinery emissions, not by a tax on the final uses of the fuel products of the refinery. This remains true 
even if there is a clear economic and physical linkage between the final use of the refinery products and 
the emissions from the refinery.  Now, if there is such a linkage, we may say that refinery pollution is a 
cost of motor-vehicle use -- because motor-fuel use does, through a chain of events, give rise to the 
environmental costs of the refinery -- and one way or another, whether via the Pigovian tax or a separate 
calculation of marginal damages,  we must count the refinery pollution as a cost of motor-vehicle use.  
However, linkage or no, we should levy the pollution tax at the refinery stacks.  
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equal the damage39. Note too that the cost of pollution control equipment cannot be 
construed as a Pigovian tax: the economic cost of pollution-control equipment is the 
value of the resources used to make and operate control equipment, whereas a correct 
Pigovian tax is equal to the marginal cost of the remaining (post-control) pollution. In a 
social-cost analysis control costs and post-control damage costs are additive, not 
equivalent. 
 Nonmonetary externalities are estimated in Report #9 of this social-cost series. 
Appendix C of this report provides an overview of some of the concepts, data, and 
estimation methods for some of the cost items in this column. 
 
1.4.7   Column 6b of Table 1-1: Nonmonetary costs of infrastructure 
 Note that I have classified the nonmonetary social and environmental impacts of 
the motor-vehicle infrastructure in part b of column 6, separate from the non-monetary 
externalities of motor-vehicle use.  Although these infrastructure costs ultimately are a 
long-run cost of total motor-vehicle use, they are not a cost of marginal or incremental 
motor-vehicle use, because they do not vary with each mile or trip. Hence, 
infrastructure costs are not externalities of motor-vehicle use, according to our 
definition of “externality”, and for this reason are categorized separately from external 
costs. Note too that we we have not actually estimated any of these environmental costs 
of infrastructure. (One should not presume, though, that omitted costs necessarily are 
trivial.)  
 
1.4.8  Summary observations regarding Table 1-1 
 Divergence between price and marginal social cost increases from left to right.  
One perhaps can argue that, in general terms, the “typical” divergence between the 
marginal social cost and the actual price (or the marginal social value) in each column of 
Table 1-1 increases as one moves from column 1 to column 6. For the items in the first 
column, there is little or no divergence between marginal social cost and marginal social 
value; for those in the last column, the price is zero but the marginal social cost can be 
considerable.   
Long-run vs. short run and direct vs. indirect costs.   In order to keep Table 1-1 
manageable, I have not distinguished in the table between costs incurred immediately 
as a result of motor-vehicle use (one might call these “direct short-run” costs), and costs 
incurred in the long run, or only indirectly, as a result of motor-vehicle use. However, 
these distinctions are important. 
                                                
39Suppose that we wish to estimate the social cost (private cost plus external cost) of using motor 
gasoline. We know that there is a relationship between the amount of motor fuel consumed and the 
amount that refineries produce, and a relationship between the amount of fuel that refineries produce 
and the amount of pollutants they emit. We therefore may count as a cost of using motor gasoline  the 
value of the environmental damages from emissions from petroleum refineries making gasoline. In a 
world without true marginal-cost Pigovian taxes -- i.e., in the real world of today and tomorrow -- we can 
make an independent estimate the value of the environmental damages from making motor gasoline, and 
add to it the refineries’  actual private cost (exclusive of taxes) of making gasoline, as part of our estimate 
of the social cost of motor gasoline. This is  what we do here. But what if the emissions from refineries 
actually were assessed a Pigovian charge equal to the marginal damage that they caused? In that case, the 
damage cost would be internalized at the refineries (which, as pointed out above, is where it should be 
internalized), and the refineries’ private cost would include the cost of environmental damage.  To add to 
this private cost an independent estimate  of the environmental damages in this case would double-count 
the damages.   
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Motor vehicle use does not give rise to costs “automatically,” according to some 
immutable laws of physics or to the logic of mathematics, but rather is linked to costs -- 
to particular effects, or changes in actual resource consumption – by economic, political, 
technological, and natural processes. Some links are direct and almost immediate. For 
example, motor-vehicle use is linked directly by combustion processes to motor-vehicle 
emissions of CO, emissions of CO in turn are linked directly by atmospheric processes 
to ambient levels of CO, and ambient levels of CO are linked statistically, by behavioral 
and biological processes, to headaches. In this case, the linkage between use and cost 
(headaches) is largely physical, and almost immediate.  
But linkages can be much more attenuated than this. For example, the linkage 
between motor-vehicle use and a change in refinery emissions is more complicated than 
the linkage between motor-vehicle use and a change in motor-vehicle tailpipe 
emissions, because there are intervening economic as well as physical processes. In 
theory, a change in motor-vehicle use will change quantity and hence price in the 
market for gasoline, which in turn will affect price in the market for crude oil, which in 
turn will affect price in the market for other petroleum products (such as heating oil). In 
theory, refinery owners will adjust to the price changes by changing the mix and 
amount of refinery products. This economically induced change in output will be linked 
physically to changes in refinery emissions, which in turn will be linked to ambient 
pollution and then to health effects. And all of this is a theoretical simplification: in 
reality, political factors and economic variables other than price will be important too.  
And the linkages between motor-vehicle use and cost can be even more tenuous: 
they can depend not only price changes, which at least in economic theory are  
“mechanisms,” but on the decisions of public policymakers as well. Consider the links 
between motor-vehicle use and defense expenditures in the Middle East. First, the 
change in motor-fuel use will change demand for oil, but not barrel for barrel, because 
prices of and hence demand for other petroleum products will change. The change in 
demand for oil might change demand for oil imported from the Middle East, depending 
on the price of domestic versus imported oil, sunk costs, contractual arrangements, 
political conditions, and other factors. Congress then might notice any change in oil 
imports from the Middle East, and then might decide that it means that the U.S. cares 
less about the region and need not devote as many resources to policing it. Such 
government decisions make the link between motor-vehicle use and military 
expenditures especially hard to represent formally. 
Although Table 1-1 does not make these distinctions, they nevertheless are 
important because the more tenuously linked costs are harder to estimate, often are 
lagged considerably with respect to the causal changes in motor-vehicle use, and often 
depend greatly on the specific characteristics and amount of the change in motor-
vehicle use. The upshot is that it is especially dubious to use willy-nilly, in any context, 
our estimates of the total or average cost of the more tenuously linked costs.  
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1.4.9  The quality of the estimates 
Table 1-1 lists nearly 50 individual components of the total social cost of motor-
vehicle use. For some of these cost components, we were able to develop original, 
reasonably detailed estimates. However, in many other cases we simply took estimates 
from the literature or made educated guesses. Thus, there is quite a wide range in the 
quality of our estimates. In order to provide an overview of the quality of our estimates, 
and help readers understand initially which estimates are sound and which are little 
better than guesswork (and of course which are in-between), we have rated each of our 
estimates. The rating system is delineated in Table 1-3, and the ratings are presented in 
Tables 1-4 to 1-9. (Note that the rating system presented in Table 1-3 is very similar but 
not identical to the rating system used in the literature review of Report #3.) 
 
 
1.5  THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
The results of this analysis are shown by individual cost item in Tables 1-4 to 1-9, 
and summarized by aggregate cost category in Table 1-10. The cost items correspond to 
those in Table 1-1.  I show the aggregated totals here in order to provide a sense of 
magnitudes, not because such aggregated totals are themselves useful. Indeed, as 
discussed next, one must be careful to avoid misusing estimates of the total social-cost 
of motor-vehicle use. 
As stated in the notes to Tables 1-4 to 1-9, the estimates are detailed in the other 
reports of this social-cost series (listed at the beginning of this report).  
 
1.5.1  Allocation of costs to individual vehicle categories 
 All of the costs shown in Tables 1-4 to 1-9 pertain to all motor vehicles: all autos, 
trucks, and buses.  Although it can be interesting to estimate the cost of all motor-
vehicle use, it typically will be more useful to estimate the cost of different classes of 
vehicles or of different fuel types, because analysts, policymakers, and regulators 
typically are interested in specific classes of vehicles, and specific fuels, rather than all 
motor-vehicles as a group. (For example, pollution regulations are set for individual 
classes of vehicles, not for all motor vehicles as a class.)  
For some cost items, such as the some of the costs of air pollution, we have 
estimated marginal costs by individual vehicle class (see Report #9 in this social-cost 
series). In most cases, though, we have not actually estimated costs by vehicle class. 
However, we have developed simple cost-allocation factors, which can be used to 
apportion or disaggregate some total costs to specific vehicle and fuel classes. These 
factors are developed in Report #10 of the social-cost series, and summarized here in 
Appendix A and Table 1-A5.  
  
1.5.2   How the results of this analysis should not be used 
 Earlier in this report, I explain the proper uses of a social-cost analysis. In this 
section, I caution against several common misuses of estimates of the total social cost.   
 First, one should resist the temptation to add up all of the unpriced costs, and 
express the total per gallon of gasoline, as if the optimal strategy to remedy every 
inefficiency were simply to raise the gasoline tax. Rather, as indicated in Table 1-2, the 
various kinds of inefficiencies, or market failures or imperfections, require various 
kinds of remedies. In fact, it turns out that there is not a single external cost, with the 
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possible exception of CO2 emissions from vehicles, that in principle is most efficiently 
addressed by a gasoline tax.  
 In the first place, some sources of inefficiency, such as imperfect competition and 
distortionary income tax policy, are not externalities, and hence should be addressed 
not by Pigovian taxation, but by ensuring that the markets are competitive and only 
minimally distorted by taxation. Similarly, it is not theoretically ideal (in a first-best 
world), to force privately provided free parking to be priced; rather, one should amend 
any tax and regulatory policies that distort the pricing and bundling decisions of 
private suppliers.  
 Even where Pigovian taxation is called for, a tax on gasoline is not the ideal 
application. For example, an optimal air pollution tax would be a function of the 
amount and kind of emissions, the ambient conditions, and the size of the exposed 
population; it would not be simply proportional to gasoline consumption. Similarly, an 
optimal congestion charge would be a dynamic function of traffic conditions. Costs that 
arise from the use of particular sources of oil, such as oil imported from the Middle 
East, should be addressed at the source, not at the level of  all gasoline end use. And in 
any case, it is not even necessarily true, in the real and far-from-first-best world  of 
regulations, standards, taxes, imperfect taxes, poor information, imperfect competition, 
and so on,  that the optimal emissions tax is equal to the cost of the marginal residual 
emissions (Burtraw et al., 1993)40.  
 Second, I caution that it might be misleading to compare the total social cost of 
motor-vehicle use with the Gross National Product (GNP) of the United States, because 
the GNP accounting is quite different from and generally more restricted than our 
social-cost accounting. For example, the GNP does not include any non-market items, 
which constitute a substantial portion of the social cost estimated here.   
 Third, one should properly represent and interpret the considerable uncertainty 
in any estimate of social cost. Uncertainty can be represented by low-high ranges, 
scenario analyses, probability distributions, and other techniques. Our analysis presents 
low and high estimates of cost. Yet, strictly speaking, these estimates are not lower and 
upper bounds, even where the high is much higher than the low, because we did not 
estimate every conceivable component or effect of every cost, and did not always 
accommodate the entire span of data or opinions in the literature. Moreover, we do not 
know how probable the higher and lower values are, or even if the higher is more 
probable than the lower; in fact, we do not know anything about the probability 
distribution of the estimated total cost. We can not even offer a “best” guess between 
our low and high estimates. 
 Fourth, as discussed in Appendix D, it is not economically meaningful to compare 
estimates of user tax and fee payments for public motor-vehicle goods and services with 
estimates of government expenditures for same. Most emphatically, it simply is not true 
that, in order to have the economically optimal amount and use of public motor-vehicle 
goods and services, the revenues collected from the present system of user charges must 
equal government expenditures. It is not true because the present taxes and fees look 
nothing like efficient marginal-cost prices, and because in any case it is not a necessary 
or sufficient condition of economic efficiency that the government collect from users of 
                                                
40Against this, however, Freeman (1997) notes that even if the emissions standards results in lower 
emissions than is consistent with economic efficiency, there still should be a tax on miles equal to the 
residual marginal damages. 
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the highway infrastructure revenues equal to expenditures. Comparisons between 
present user payments and present government expenditures are relevant only to 
concerns about equity (See Appendix D for further discussion.)  
 Finally, given that ours is an analysis of the total  social cost of motor-vehicle use, 
whereas any particular policy or investment decision will involve costs incremental or 
decremental to the total, one should not use our average-cost estimates in marginal 
analyses, unless, as discussed above, one believes that the total-cost function is 
approximately linear and hence that any marginal-cost rate is close to the average rate. 
Certainly, our results will become less and less applicable as one considers times and 
places increasingly different from the U.S. in 1990 and 1991. However, I note that, even 
if our results per se are irrelevant, our data, methods, concepts, and cost models might 
be useful in an analysis of specific pricing policies or investments.  
 
 
1.6  SUMMARY 
 
 We have classified and estimated the social costs of motor-vehicle use in the U. 
S., on the basis of 1990-1991 data. Our analysis is meant to inform general decisions 
about pricing, investment, and research. It provides a conceptual framework for 
analyzing social costs, develops analytical methods and data sources, and presents 
some detailed first-cut estimates of some of the costs.  
 By now it should be clear that a social-cost analysis cannot tell us precisely what 
we should do to improve our transportation system. There are several kinds of 
inefficiencies in the motor-vehicle system, and hence several kinds of appropriate 
correctives. Many of our estimates are simply too generic or uncertain to be of much use 
-- as hard numbers -- to policymakers and analysts faced with specific problems.  
Moreover, society cares at least as much about equity, opportunity, and justice as it 
does about economic efficiency. At the end of the day, a total social-cost analysis 
contributes modestly to but one of several societal objectives for transportation.  
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TABLE  1-1. CLASSIFICATION OF THE COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE 
 
Personal Costs Private-sector Costs:  Public-sector Costs External costs (except 6b) 
MPC or MPV might 
be mis-estimated, 
because of poor 
information or 
irrational behavior 
Prices are not optimal because of imperfect 
standards (MCC ≠ MDC), distortionary taxes, 
subsidies, price controls, quotas, imperfect 
competition (P ≠ MPC),  or poor information  
Bundling decision 
can be distorted or 
determined by 
regulations, taxes, 
poor information  
User taxes and fees ≠ 
MPC, and B/C not 
maximized, because 
of non-efficiency 
objectives  
These are unpriced (MPC ≠ MSC in markets with externalities) because of the 
absence of fully enforced individual or collective property rights, or the absence of 
optimal Pigovian taxes 
Nonmonetary Monetary costs Nonmonetary costs 
(1) Personal non- 
monetary costs of 
MV use 
(2) MV goods and services produced and 
priced in the private sector (estimated net 
of producer surplus and taxes and fees) 
(3) MV goods 
bundled in the 
private sector 
(4) MV goods and 
services provided 
by government 
(5) Monetary externalities of MV 
use 
(6a) Nonmonetary externalities of MV use 
• Travel time, 
excluding travel 
delay imposed by 
others, that 
displaces unpaid 
activities 
• Accidental pain, 
suffering, death, 
and lost nonmarket 
productivity 
inflicted on oneself 
• Personal time 
spent working on 
MVs and garages, 
refueling MVs, and 
buying and 
disposing of MVs 
and parts 
 
These kinds of costs usually are included in GNP-
type accounts: 
• Annualized cost of the fleet (excluding 
vehicles replaced as a result of motor-vehicle 
accidents) 
• Cost of transactions for used cars 
• Parts, supplies, maintenance, repair, 
cleaning, storage, renting, towing, etc. 
(excluding parts and services in repair of 
vehicles damaged in accidents) 
• Motor fuel and lubricating oil, excluding cost 
of fuel use attributable to delay 
• Motor-vehicle insurance: administrative and 
management costs 
• Priced private commercial and residential 
parking, excluding parking taxes 
 
 
Usually not included in GNP-type account: 
• Annualized cost of 
non-residential 
offstreet  parking 
included in the 
price of goods and 
services or offered 
as an employee 
benefit 
• Annualized cost of  
offstreet residential  
parking included in 
the price of 
housing 
• Annualized cost of 
roads provided or 
paid for by the 
private sector and 
recovered in the 
price of structures, 
goods, or services 
• Annualized cost of 
public highways, 
including on-street 
parking  
• Annualized cost of 
municipal and 
institutional off-
street parking 
• Highway law 
enforcement and 
safety 
• Regulation and 
control of MV air, 
water, and solid 
waste pollution 
• MV and energy 
technology R&D 
• Monetary costs of travel delay 
imposed by others: extra 
consumption of fuel, and foregone 
paid work 
• Accident costs not accounted  for by 
economically responsible party: 
property damage, medical, 
productivity, and legal and 
administrative costs 
• Macroeconomic adjustment losses 
of GDP due to oil-price shocks 
• Pecuniary externality: increased 
payments to foreign countries for 
non-transport oil, due to ordinary 
price effect of using petroleum for 
motor vehicles 
• Monetary, non-public-sector costs 
of fires and net crimes* related to 
using or having MV goods, 
services, or infrastructure  
• Accidental pain, suffering, death, and lost 
nonmarket productivity, not accounted for 
by the economically responsible party 
• Travel delay, imposed by other drivers, that 
displaces unpaid activities 
• Air pollution: effects on human health, crops, 
materials, and visibility** 
• Global warming due to fuel-cycle emissions 
of greenhouse gases (U.S. damages only) 
• Noise from motor vehicles 
• Water pollution: effects of leaking storage 
tanks, oil spills, urban runoff, road deicing  
• Nonmonetary costs of fires and net crimes* 
related to using or having MV goods, 
services, or infrastructure 
• Air pollution damages to ecosystems other 
than forests, costs of motor-vehicle waste, 
vibration damages, fear of MVs and MV-
related crime (not quantified here) 
• MV noise and air 
pollution inflicted 
on oneself  
• Travel time, excluding travel delay imposed 
by others, that displaces paid work 
• Overhead expenses of business and 
government fleets 
• Private monetary costs of motor-vehicle 
accidents, including user payments for cost 
of motor-vehicle accidents inflicted on others, 
but excluding insurance administration costs 
 • Police protection (excl. highway patrol), court and 
corrections system (net of cost of substitute crimes) 
• Fire protection 
• Motor-vehicle related costs of other agencies 
• Military expenditures related to the use of Persian-Gulf oil 
by motor vehicles 
• Annualized cost of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
(6b) Nonmonetary impacts of the MV 
infrastructure# (not quantified here) 
• Land-use damage: habitat, species loss due 
to highways, MV infrastructure 
• The socially divisive effect of roads as 
physical barriers in communities 
• Esthetics of highways and vehicle and 
service establishments 
 
MPC = marginal private cost; MPV = marginal private value; P = price, MCC = marginal control cost; MDC = marginal damage cost; B/C = dollar benefit/cost ratio of investment; MSC = marginal social cost; MV = motor 
vehicle; GNP = gross national product; R&D = research and development.  
 
*These really should be classified not as external costs, within an economic framework, but rather as costs of illegal or immoral behavior, within a framework that encompasses more than just economic criteria. However, 
regardless of how these are classified, they in fact are related to using or having motor-vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure. See Report #2 for further discussion 
 
**The cost of crop loss, and some of the components of other costs of air pollution (e.g., the cost of medical treatment of sickness caused by motor-vehicle air pollution), probably should be classified as monetary externalities.  
 
#Although these are nonmonetary environmental and social costs of total motor-vehicle use, they are not costs of marginal motor-vehicle use, and hence technically are not externalities 
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TABLE 1-2. EFFICIENT PRICING OF MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
Private-sector 
costs 
Bundled private-
sector costs 
Public-sector infrastructure 
and services  
Externalities 
 
Factors affecting efficient marginal-cost pricing 
 
General taxes 
and subsidies; 
controls on 
quantity or 
price; non-
optimal 
standards; 
imperfect 
competition 
High transaction 
costs of unbundling 
and establishing 
prices; tax and 
regulatory 
disincentives to 
charging for 
parking; perceived 
economic benefits 
of free parking and 
roads 
Possible indivisibility in 
consumption (MC = 0; e.g., 
defense); decreasing long-run 
costs (e.g., some roads); 
government is concerned with 
generating revenue, 
encouraging or discouraging 
certain behaviors, distributing 
benefits, providing security 
and justice, and other things 
besides economic efficiency 
Impossible, or 
too costly, or 
otherwise 
undesirable  to 
assign and 
enforce 
property rights 
to the unpriced 
resources or 
effects (hence, 
no price) 
 
Ideal prescriptions 
 
Set taxes to 
minimize 
deadweight 
losses (or use 
lump-sum 
transfers 
instead of 
taxes); set 
standards such 
that MCC = 
MDC; remove 
controls on 
price and 
quantity; break 
up monopolies 
and oligopolies; 
and so on 
If there are no 
external benefits to 
unbundling, and no 
distorting taxes, 
and if transaction 
costs cannot be 
lowered and 
private assessments 
are not wrong, then 
do nothing; 
otherwise, remove 
tax and regulatory 
disincentives to 
unbundling, and 
remove any 
institutional 
barriers to private 
ownership and 
operation of roads 
Turn ownership over to private 
sector, where possible and 
efficient; short-run marginal-
cost pricing, where possible 
(highway use charges set equal 
to marginal wear and tear plus 
congestion costs; registration 
and license fees set at marginal 
administration costs; parking 
priced at marginal cost; etc.); 
lump-sum transfers to finance 
any “public good” portion of 
highway infrastructure and 
services 
If feasible, 
establish 
property rights; 
otherwise, if 
few are 
involved, then 
do collective 
bargaining; 
otherwise, levy 
a dynamica tax, 
at the source, 
equal to 
marginal 
external costs 
[damage costs 
not accounted 
for], but do not 
compensate 
victims 
 
Notes: see next page. 
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Notes to Table 1-2.   
 
See also Appendix E of FHWA (1982), the Congressional Budget Office (1992), and Gillen (1997) 
The Federal Railroad Administration (1993) lists many pricing and mitigation strategies to 
address environmental externalities and “social costs” of transportation systems. MC = 
marginal cost;  MCC = marginal control cost; MDC = marginal damage cost.  
  Note that the prescriptions generally all must be satisfied at once in order to achieve  
Pareto-optimal resource use. The general theory of the “second best” tells us that, in the real 
world in which many of the conditions for Pareto optimality are not satisfied, it is not 
necessarily best to satisfy just one additional condition. For example, given non-optimal 
emissions standards, emissions regulations, and fees and taxes on automobile producers, it is 
not necessarily true that it is most efficient to assess a Pigovian tax equal to the marginal cost 
of the residual emissions.  
 
aIn most cases, damage is a nonlinear function of output, with the result that the marginal 
damage rate (the slope of the total damage function) changes with the level of output. In these 
cases, the Pigovian tax will have to be iterated to stay equal to the marginal damage rate, 
because the initial application of the Pigovian tax will change the output and hence the 
marginal damage. Such an iterated tax is a “dynamic” tax.  
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TABLE 1-3.  DESCRIPTION OF OUR RATINGS OF THE QUALITY AND COMPLEXITY OF OUR 
ANALYSIS 
 
Quality of our analysis Rating 
Detailed and largely original analysis, with extensive calculations based 
mainly on primary data. Primary data include: original censuses and 
surveys of population, employment and wages, government 
expenditures, manufacturing, production and consumption of goods 
and services, travel, energy use, and crime; financial statistics 
collected by government agencies, such as the Internal Revenue 
Service and state motor-vehicle departments; measured 
environmental data, such as of ambient air quality and visibility; 
surveys and inventories of physical infrastructure, such as housing 
stock and roads; and the results of empirical statistical analyses, such 
as epidemiological analyses of air pollution and health. 
A1 
Detailed and original analysis based mainly on primary data, but less 
involved than level A1 analysis (see A1 for examples of primary 
data). 
A2 
Straightforward analysis based partly or mainly on primary data, with 
few and relatively simple calculations. Less involved than A2 
analysis.  
A3 
Direct use of a few primary data, with no significant analysis, 
calculations, or adjustments. A simple citation of primary data. 
A4 
Review and analysis of existing estimates of the whole cost or its major 
components. The difference between B work and A work is that A 
work is based mainly on primary data, such as from government 
surveys or data series or physical measurements (see above), 
whereas B work is more dependent on the secondary literature (i.e., 
on someone else’s original analysis of some major components of the 
social cost). However, the analysis in B work can be more extensive 
than that in A3 and certainly A4 work.  
B 
Review of a few existing estimates, with little or no analysis. This is 
essentially a literature review.  
C 
Estimate or simple, illustrative calculation based ultimately on 
supposition or judgment. Whereas C work cites a substantive 
analysis or estimate of the cost under consideration, D work is based 
on judgment without reference to any direct estimate of the cost or 
its major components.  
D 
 
 37 
TABLE 1-4. PERSONAL NONMONETARY COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1991 (BILLION 
1991$) 
 
   Cost item Low High Qa 
Travel time, excluding travel delay imposed by others, 
that displaces unpaid activities 
406.8 629.0 A2 
Accidental pain, suffering, death, and lost nonmarket 
productivity inflicted on oneself  
70.2 227.0 A2/B 
Personal time spent working on motor vehicles and 
garages, and refueling motor vehicles 
49.5 109.6 A3 
Personal time spent buying and selling and disposing of 
vehicles, excluding dealer costs 
0.8 2.6 A3 
Motor-vehicle noise inflicted on oneself included with external 
noise costs 
Motor-vehicle air pollution inflicted on oneself included with external 
pollution costs 
Total 527.3 968.2  
 
See Report #4 for details.  
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3).  
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TABLE 1-5. MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES PRICED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(COST ESTIMATED NET OF PRODUCER SURPLUS AND TAXES AND FEES), 1991 (109 1991$)   
 
   Cost item Low High Qa 
Usually included in GNP-type accounts    
Annualized cost of the entire motor-vehicle car and truck 
fleet, excluding sales taxesb 
269.2 350.2 A3 
Cost of transactions for used cars 12.7 12.7 A3 
Parts, supplies, maintenance, repair, cleaning, storage, 
renting, towing, etc.b 
159.9 188.1 A3 
Motor fuel and lubricating oil, excluding excise and sales 
taxes and fuel costs attributable to travel delay 
74.9 82.2 A2 
Motor-vehicle insurance: administrative and management 
costs 
36.7 36.7 A4 
Priced private commercial and residential parking, 
excluding parking taxes 
3.2 3.2 A3 
Usually not included in GNP-type accounts    
Travel time, excluding travel delay imposed by others, that 
displaces paid work 
190.1 229.1 A2 
Overhead expenses of business, commercial, and 
government fleets 
90.3 112.9 A3 
Private monetary costs of motor-vehicle accidents, excluding 
user paymentsc 
65.7 65.6 A2/B 
Motor-vehicle user payments for the cost of motor-vehicle 
accidents inflicted on others 
55.7 58.8 A4/D 
Deduction for property damage, and motor-vehicle 
insurance administration costs counted elsewhere (as 
private monetary costs here, or as external monetary costs) 
(65.2) (74.8) A2/B 
Deduction for embedded taxes included in the price-times-
quantity estimates above 
(59.8) (57.6) A2/A
3 
Deduction for bundled parking costs included in cost of any 
industries above, but counted separately here as a bundled 
parking cost 
(6.4) (26.6) D 
Total 826.9 980.4  
 
See Report #5 for details.  
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3).  
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bThese figures include costs related to motor-vehicle accidents. Because these costs also are 
counted in the line “private monetary costs of motor-vehicle accidents”, they are deducted in 
a separate line (“Deduction for property damage...”), to avoid double counting.  
 
cThe figure under “Low” might be higher than the figure under “High” because a total 
estimated accident cost is allocated to the different cost categories on the basis of low and high 
externality fractions, whereby “Low” means low external cost -- and hence high private or 
personal cost -- and “High” means high external cost.  
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TABLE 1-6. MOTOR-VEHICLE GOODS AND SERVICES BUNDLED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR , 
1991 (109 1991$) 
 
   Cost item Low High Qa 
Annualized cost of non-residential offstreet parking 
included in the price of goods or services or offered as an 
employee benefit 
48.5 162.2 A2 
Annualized cost of  home garages, carports, and other 
residential parking included in the price of housing 
15.4 40.6 A2 
Annualized cost of roads provided or paid for by the private 
sector and recovered in the price of structures, goods, or 
services 
11.8 75.9 A3, Db 
Total 75.7 278.7  
 
See Report #6 for details. 
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3 ).  
 
bA simple calculation involving some solid numbers and some guesswork.  
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TABLE 1-7. MOTOR-VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES AND SERVICES PROVIDED 
BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1991 AND 2002 (109 $)  
 
 10% 
∆MVU 
(1991) 
100% ∆MVU 
(1991) 
100% ∆MVU 
(2002) 
 
Cost item Low High Low High Low High Qa 
A1. Direct expenditures (FHWA)b        
Annualized cost of highways (FHWA) 9.0 18.5 90.4 184.9 159.9 335.7 A2 
Highway law enforcement and safety  0.45 0.70 7.4 8.7 12.6 15.8 A3 
A2. Other direct expendituresc        
Collection expenses, LUST, extra m&r 0.46 0.46 4.7 4.7 8.3 8.3 A3 
Annualized cost of municipal and 
institutional offstreet parking 
n.e. n.e. 11.9 19.8 17.5 29.0 A2/
3 
Deduction for embedded private 
investment in roads 
(0.30) (0.75) (3.0) (7.5) (6.6) (16.7) C 
B. Indirect expenditures          
Other police-protection costs (not 
estimatd by FHWA) related to MV use 
0.10 0.47 0.8 4.1 1.9 9.3 A2 
Fire-protection costs related to MV use 0.07 0.27 0.7 2.8 1.4 5.5 A2 
Emergency-service costs of MV 
accidents included in police and fire 
costs  
(0.15) (0.16) (1.1) (1.1) (1.4) (1.4) A2/
B 
Judicial and legal-system costs  0.46 0.59 4.8 6.2 8.9 11.6 A2 
Legal costs of MV accidents included 
under judicial and legal-system costs 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.9) (0.9) (1.2) (1.2) A2 
Jail, prison, probation, and parole costs 
related to MV use 
0.39 0.61 3.9 6.2 7.0 9.4 A2 
Regulation and control of air, water and 
solid-waste pollution related to MV use 
0.17 0.56 2.1 5.9 7.1 15.4 A2 
Energy and technology R & D  n.e. n.e. 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.8 A3 
MV-related costs of other agencies n.e. n.e. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 D 
Military expenditures related to the use 
of Persian-Gulf oil by MVs 
n.e. n.e. 0.8 8.5 0.8 11.2 B, 
Dd 
Annualized cost of the SPR 0.00 0.06 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.9 A2 
Total n.e. n.e. 122.9 243.2 216.5 433.6  
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Notes: see next page 
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See Report #7 for details. 
 
∆MVU = change in motor-vehicle use; MV = motor vehicle; O & M = operation & management. 
 
a Q = Quality of the baseline year-1991 estimate (see Table 1-3).  
 
b With minor exceptions, these are based on FHWA estimates of government expenditures for 
highways. The A1 estimates shown here exclude user tax-and-fee collection expenses, LUST-
fund costs, and extra maintenance and repair (m&r) costs, but include the embedded private-
sector investment in roads (Table 7-4), because the FHWA expenditure estimates exclude 
collection, LUST, and extra m&r costs, but include embedded private costs. In part A2 of this 
table the excluded collection, LUST, and extra m&r costs are added back in, and the included 
embedded private costs are deducted.  
 
c See note b.   
 
d A review and analysis of the literature with a good deal of supposition. See Report #15 for 
details. 
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TABLE 1-8.  MONETARY EXTERNALITIES OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1991 (109 1991$) 
 
Cost item Low High Qa 
Monetary costs of travel delay imposed by others: foregone 
paid work 
9.1 30.5 A2 
Monetary costs of travel delay imposed by others: extra 
consumption of fuel 
2.3 5.7 A2 
Accident costs not accounted for by economically responsible 
party: property damage, medical, productivity, legal and 
administrative costs 
26.0 28.0 A2/B 
Macroeconomic adjustment costs related to oil-price shocks 1.8 31.5 B [A1] 
Pecuniary externality: increased payments to foreign 
countries for oil used in non-motor-vehicle sectors, due to 
ordinary price effect of using petroleum for motor vehicles 
3.8 8.0 A3 
Monetary, non-public-sector costs of net crimes related to 
using or having motor-vehicle goods, services, or 
infrastructure 
0.1 0.4 A3 
Monetary costs of injuries and deaths caused by fires related 
to motor-vehicle use 
0.0 0.1 A3 
Total 43.1 104.2  
 
See Report #8 for details.  
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3). Ratings in brackets refer to the quality of the 
analysis in the literature reviewed.  
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TABLE 1-9A NONMONETARY EXTERNALITIES OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE, 1990-91 (109  1991$ 
  
   Cost item Low High Qa. 
Accidental pain, suffering, death, and lost nonmarket 
productivity not accounted for by economically responsible 
party 
9.5 97.7 A2/B 
Travel delay, imposed by others, that displaces unpaid 
activities 
22.5 99.3 A2 
Air pollution: human mortality and morbidity due to 
particulate emissionsb from vehicles 
16.7 266.4 A1 
Air pollution: human mortality and morbidity due to all 
other pollutants from vehicles 
2.3 17.1 A1 
Air pollution: human mortality and morbidity, due to all 
pollutants from upstream processes 
2.3 13.0 A1 
Air pollution: human mortality and morbidity, due to road 
dust 
3.0 153.5 A1 
Air pollution: loss of visibility, due to all pollutants 
attributable to motor vehicles 
5.1 36.9 A1 
Air pollution: damage to agricultural crops, due to ozone 
attributable to motor vehicles 
3.3 5.7 A1 
Air pollution: damages to materials, due to all pollutants 
attributable to motor vehicles 
0.4 8.0 B [A1] 
Air pollution: damage to forests, due to all pollutants 
attributable to motor vehicles 
0.2 2.0 B [A2] 
Climate change due to lifecycle emissions of greenhouse 
gases (U. S. damages only) 
0.0 3.5 A1, B 
[A1]c 
Noise from motor vehicles 0.5 15.0 A1 
Water pollution: health and environmental effects of 
leaking motor-fuel storage tanks 
0.1 0.5 D 
Water pollution: environmental and economic impacts of 
large oil spills 
0.2 0.5 C [A1] 
Water pollution: urban runoff polluted by oil from motor 
vehicles, and pollution from highway deicing 
0.7 1.7 Dd 
Nonmonetary costs of net crimes related to using or having 
motor-vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure 
0.7 2.8 A3 
Nonmonetary costs of  fires related to using or having 
motor-vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure 
0.0 0.2 A3 
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TABLE CONTINUED. (COSTS NOT ESTIMATED HERE)  
 
Air pollution: damages to natural ecosystems other than 
forests, due to all pollutants attributable to motor vehicles 
n.e. n.e. n.a. 
Environmental and esthetic impacts of motor-vehicle waste n.e. n.e. n.a. 
Vibration damages from motor vehicles n.e. n.e. n.a. 
Fear and avoidance of motor vehicles and crimes related to 
motor-vehicle use 
n.e. n.e. n.a. 
Total 68.0 729.6  
 
 
 
TABLE 1-9B. NONMONETARY ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF THE MOTOR-
VEHICLE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
   Cost item Low High Qa 
Land-use damage: habitat destruction and species loss due 
to highway and motor-vehicle infrastructure 
n.e. n.e. n.a. 
The socially divisive effect of roads as physical barriers in 
communities 
n.e. n.e. n.a. 
The esthetics of highways and service establishments n.e. n.e. n.a. 
Total n.e. n.e.  
 
See Report #9 for details. n.e. = not estimated; n.a. = not applicable. Note that all air pollution 
estimates include costs of air pollution inflicted by drivers on themselves, technically part of 
personal nonmonetary costs. 
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3). Ratings in brackets refer to the quality of the 
analysis in the literature reviewed.  
 
bIncludes secondary PM, formed from direct emissions of SOx, NOx, and NH3. 
cThe estimate of lifecycle emissions of greenhouse-gases is original and detailed (A1), whereas 
the estimate of the $/ton cost of emissions is based on a review of literature (B) that reports 
results from detailed model calculations ([A1]). 
dThis is my estimate of the cost as of 1997. As discussed in the text, the cost probably was 
higher in 1991, because the leakage-prevention and clean-up programs were not in place 
everywhere. I speculate that the external costs in 1991 were three times the costs today.  
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TABLE 1-10.  SUMMARY OF THE COSTS OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE 
 
 Total cost     
(109 $) 
Percentage of  
total 
 Low High Low High 
(1) Personal nonmonetary costs of motor-vehicle 
use 
$527 $968 32% 29% 
(2) Motor-vehicle goods and services produced 
and priced in the private sector (estimated net 
of producer surplus, taxes, fees) 
$827 $980 50% 30% 
(3) Motor-vehicle goods and services bundled in 
the private sector 
$76 $279 5% 8% 
(4) Motor-vehicle infrastructure and services 
provided by the public sectora 
$123 $243 7% 7% 
(5) Monetary externalities of motor-vehicle use $43 $104 3% 3% 
(6) Nonmonetary externalities of motor-vehicle use $68 $730 4% 22% 
Grand total social cost of highway transportation $1,664 $3,304 100% 100% 
Subtotal: monetary cost only (2+3+4+5) $1,069 $1,606 64% 49% 
 
For details, see other summary tables in this report, the text in this report, and other reports in 
the social-cost series.  
 
aIncludes items in Table 1-1 that straddle columns 4 and 5. 
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FIGURE 1-1.  SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MOTOR VEHICLE USE 
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APPENDIX A. USE OF SOCIAL COST ESTIMATES TO EVALUATE 
THE COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS 
 
 
In an evaluation of the costs of specific transportation projects, the social-cost 
analysis presented here may be used in three ways:  
1). The concepts, data, methods, and models of this analysis may be used to 
develop specific, marginal-cost estimates or functions for a particular project.  This in 
principle is the best use of our analysis. 
2). The marginal (but “generic”) unit-cost results (e.g., $/kg-pollutant) derived 
from detailed cost functions or models in this analysis may be used directly to calculate 
total costs for a particular project, as delineated below. However, the greater the 
divergence between the conditions to which the “generic” marginal unit-cost estimates 
of our analysis apply and the conditions of the particular project at hand, the less 
appropriate it is to use the unit-cost results directly.   
3). Least preferably, and generally only given an inability to do 1) or 2), an 
analyst may calculate simple average-cost figures (e.g., $/mile) from the results 
presented here, and use them to estimate total costs for the project hand (e.g., by 
multiplying $/mile by VMT). This usually will not be not defensible for anything other 
than broad-brush planning.   
 
1.A.1 Use of concepts, data, methods, and models 
If one wishes to make detailed, accurate cost estimates for the project at hand, 
then one should not use the cost results of this social-cost analysis at all, but rather 
should use this series of reports as an analytical guide, and source of data and 
references, for the construction of project-specific cost models and functions. For 
example, one can use Report #14 to construct a model of noise damages, Report #12 to 
construct a model of agricultural costs, the travel-time data and functions of Report #4 
in an analysis of the cost of congestion, the accident rate and cost functions of Report 
#19 in an analysis of accident costs, and the cost functions of Report #7 to estimate the 
cost of government services related to motor-vehicle use.   
 
1.A.2 Use of unit-cost results derived from detailed cost functions.  
 In some cases, we have derived marginal unit-cost measures from our detailed 
cost models. Because these are marginal measures derived from detailed models, they 
generally will be more accurate, or representative, than will simple, average-cost 
measures (such as $/mile).  
  In Reports 11, 12, and 13, we use detailed cost models to estimate the health, 
agricultural, and visibility costs of air pollution per kg of pollutant emitted from motor 
vehicles. Because the $/kg value depends to some extent on the level of pollution 
(because of the nonlinearity of the damage functions), we estimate these $/kg figures 
for a 10% reduction and a 100% reduction in motor-vehicle emissions. The $/kg 
estimate multiplied by a kg/mi emission rate and then by total VMT will generate  an 
estimate of total cost. Table1-A1 summarizes the $/kg cost estimates. 
 These $/kg unit cost figures are useful precisely because they are independent of 
the kg/mi emission rate of motor vehicles. One can use them to calculate the cost of 
emissions from, say, alternative-fuel vehicles or super-emitters, both of which have 
emission rates quite different from the present national average. However, the $/kg 
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figures are proportional to the exposed population (of people or crops), which means 
that if you expect the exposed population to increase by 10% over 1990 levels, then you 
should increase the pertinent $/kg values by 10%. Similarly, the $/kg estimates are 
proportional to the assumed value of health effects, crops, and visibility. The $/kg 
estimates also depend somewhat on the total change in pollution or emissions being 
considered, because some effects are non-linearly related to pollution levels. However, 
it turns out that the dependency is not strong: most of the major costs either vary 
linearly with pollution levels (in which case the $/kg cost is independent of the 
pollution level), or else nearly linearly. 
 As an example, one can calculate the health, visibility, and agriculture value of a 
10% reduction in emissions from motor vehicles in the U. S. in the year 2000 with the 
following formula and data:  
 
  
TPCS ,A,TY = VMTS,A,TY ⋅
HP,S ,A,BY ⋅ ΔPHP,S,A,TY/BY ⋅ ΔWHA,TY/BY
+VP ,S ,A,BY ⋅ ΔPVP,S ,A,TY/BY ⋅ ΔWVA,TY/BY
+AP,S ,A,BY ⋅ ΔPAP ,S ,A,TY/BY ⋅ ΔWAA,TY/BY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⋅
ERP ,S ,A,TY
1000 ⋅RDP,S,A,TYP
∑
 
 
where: 
subscript S = emissions source (in this example, tailpipe and evaporative 
emissions from all motor vehicles) 
subscript A = the area or region (in this example, the U. S.) 
subscript TY = the target year of the analysis (in this example, the year 2000) 
subscript BY = the year of the baseline damage estimates (1990) 
subscript P = pollutant (particulate matter, carbon monoxide, etc.) 
subscript TY/BY = target-year TY relative to base year BY 
TPCS,A,TY = the total health, visibility, and agriculture cost of air pollution from 
emission source S in area A in target year TY ($) 
VMTS,A,TY = the total vehicle miles of travel by emission source S in area A in 
target year TY (for this example, assume 2.72 . 1012 miles in the year 2000 -
- a 2.4%/year growth rate from 1990 to 2000) 
HP,S,A,BY = the $/kg health cost of pollutant P emitted from emission source S in 
area A in baseline year BY (for this example, use $/kg estimates for 
“United States” in Table 11.7-7A of Report #11 [shown in Table 1-A1 
below]) 
VP,S,A,BY = the $/kg visibility cost of pollutant P emitted from emission source S 
in area A in baseline year BY (for this example, use $/kg estimates for 
“MVs” in Table 13-3c of Report #13 [shown in Table 1-A1 below]) 
AP,S,A,BY = the $/kg agricultural cost of pollutant P emitted from emission source 
S in area A in baseline year BY (for this example, use $/kg estimates for 
“all gasoline, diesel vehicles,” “direct emissions,” in Table 12-11 of Report 
#12 [shown in Table 1-A1 below]) 
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∆PHP,S,A,TY/BY = the ratio of the population exposed to health effects from 
pollutant P from source S in area A in the target year to the population 
exposed in the base year (for this example, assume 1.10 for all pollutants, 
sources, and areas -- a population growth of 1%/year from 1990 to 2000) 
∆PVP,S,A,TY/BY = the ratio of the population exposed to visibility effects from 
pollutant P from source S in area A in the target year to the population 
exposed in the base year (for this example, assume 1.10 for all pollutants, 
sources, and areas -- a population growth of 1%/year from 1990 to 2000) 
∆PAP,S,A,TY/BY = the ratio of the acreage of crops exposed to air pollution from 
pollutant P from source S in area A in the target year to the acreage 
exposed in the base year (for this example, assume 1.00 for all pollutants, 
sources, and areas -- no change from 1990 to 2000) 
∆WHA,TY/BY = the ratio of the value of a unit change in health (e.g., $/asthma 
attack) in area A in the target year to the value of a unit change in the base 
year (for this example, assume 1.00 -- no change in constant-dollar value) 
∆WVA,TY/BY = the ratio of the value of a unit change in visibility in area A in the 
target year to the value of a unit change in the base year (for this example, 
assume 1.00 -- no change in constant-dollar  value) 
∆WAA,TY/BY = the ratio of the value of a unit change in crop output in area A in 
the target year to the value of a unit change in the base year (for this 
example, assume 1.00 -- no change in constant-dollar  value) 
ERP,S,A,TY = the emission rate of pollutant P from emission source S in area A in 
target year TY (g/mi) (for this example, assume emission rates 20% lower 
than the 1990 rates given for “all M.V.s,” vehicles only (“V”), in Table 11.7-
5 of Report #11 [shown in Table 1-A1 below]) 
RDP,S,A,TY = the reduction in emissions of pollutant P from emissions source S in 
area A in target year TY (for this example, 10%, or 0.10)   
1000 = g/kg 
 
 The relevant data from reports 11, 12, and 13 are shown in Table 1-A1.  
 
 Thus, with the formula, data and assumptions above and in Table 1-A1, one can 
calculate that a 10% reduction in motor-vehicle emissions in the U. S. in the year 2000 
(TPCMVs,US,2000) is worth  $2.0 billion (low $/kg and g/mi values) to $26.8 billion (high 
$/kg and g/mi values) in foregone health, visibility, and agricultural costs.  
 In Report #14, we use a detailed model of noise generation and exposure to 
estimate the cost per mile of noise from motor vehicles. Table 1-A2 shows our base-case 
estimates of the cost per mile of noise from five different kinds of vehicles traveling on 
six different kinds of roads, assuming a 10% reduction in noise. One can of course 
multiply these estimates of $/VMT by any particular change in VMT to obtain a rough 
estimate of the cost of noise associated with the particular change in motor-vehicle use. 
Keep in mind, however, that our estimates of the national average cost per mile are a 
function of many parameters, and may be a poor approximation of costs in any 
particular area. Furthermore, the low and the high estimates, presented in Report #14 
but not here, differ from the base-case estimates shown here by more than an order of 
magnitude.  
 In Reports #7 and #8, we estimate the cost of several externalities of using oil in 
transportation. These costs, expressed per gallon of fuel consumed, are summarized in 
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Table 1-A3. However, for the following two reasons, one should not simply multiply 
the average cost per gallon in 1991 by any particular estimated change in fuel use, to 
estimate the cost of a particular change in motor-vehicle use: 
 First, in all cases, the total cost, and hence the cost/gallon estimate, depends 
directly or indirectly on the level of oil imports. Thus, as oil imports change in the 
future, the estimated $/gallon cost will change. 
 Second, none of the costs estimated in Table 1-A3 are direct, immediate resource 
costs of motor-vehicle use. As discussed previously, the cost of defending Middle-East 
oil, and the cost of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, are linked but tenuously to motor-
vehicle use. The pecuniary externality is a direct cost -- to the U. S. -- of motor-vehicle 
use, but actually is internal to the global economy.  
 Report #7 also presents cost/quantity functions for some motor-vehicle related 
government services, such as police protection, fire protection, and corrections. In 
principle, one can adapt these functions, on the basis of local values, to estimate the cost 
of marginal changes in motor-vehicle use. However, key parameters in the estimation of 
those functions are not well known.  
 In Reports #4 and #5, we estimate the cost of travel time by class of vehicle and 
travel. The results of that analysis, expressed as cents per person-mile of travel, are 
summarized in Table 1-A4. Again, one can multiply these $/VMT estimates by any 
estimated change in VMT to get a rough idea of the change in travel-time costs resulting 
from any particular change in motor-vehicle use. However, the average $/VMT figures 
of Table 1-A4 are valid only for the income levels, compensation rates, and vehicle 
speeds assumed in the national analysis. To estimate locally specific costs, it would be 
more appropriate to use the cost formulas in Reports #4 and #5, rather than the 
cost/mile results.  
 
1.A.3  Use of simple average costs 
The easiest but least accurate way to use this social-cost analysis in project 
evaluation is to calculate simple average costs measures and apply them to the 
transportation quantities estimated for the project at hand. For example, one can divide 
total public-sector expenditures on police and fire protection related to motor-vehicle 
use by, say, the amount of travel by motor vehicles, to derive police+fire cost per VMT. 
One then can multiply this $/VMT figure by the amount of VMT for the project at hand 
to estimate the police+fire protection cost for the project.   
Obviously, the validity of this use depends on the extent to which the actual 
[unknown] cost function (that is, the relationship between cost and cost-determining 
transportation parameters) for the project at hand is close to the national average cost 
rate. It should go without saying that in general the local cost function will not be the 
national average, and hence that the national average should be used only as a last 
resort.  
In any event, one can construct a variety of simple average cost measures: 
$/VMT, $/gallon, $/ton-mile, $/vehicle, $/vehicle-ton, and so on. Table 1-A5 provides 
eight different measures of motor-vehicle use that in principle can serve as the 
denominator of an average cost measure. As another example: if one believes that 
highway costs are proportional to ton-miles per axle, then one can divide total highway 
costs (Table 1-7) by total ton-miles per axle (Table 1-A5) and apply the resultant $/ton-
mile/axle measure to ton-mile/axle travel estimated for the project at hand, to estimate 
highway costs for the project.  
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Table 1-A5 also provides factors to allow one to allocate total costs to different 
vehicle classes, as discussed next.   
 
1.A.4  Cost allocation factors 
 A cost-allocation factor shows the share of a particular vehicle class of some 
general measure of motor-vehicle use. For example, the cost allocation factors of Table 
1-A5 show the share of light-duty gasoline autos of total vehicle miles of travel, and the 
share of heavy-duty diesel vehicles of total motor-vehicle expenditures for maintenance 
and repair.  Table 1-A5 shows six different vehicle types with respect to eight different 
measures of motor-vehicle use.  
 
Measure of motor-vehicle use Vehicle types 
• vehicle miles of travel • light-duty gasoline autos (LDGAs) 
• total vehicle ton-miles of travel • light-duty gasoline trucks (LDGTs) 
• total vehicle ton-miles of travel where 
tonnage is raised to the 0.7 power 
• heavy-duty gasoline vehicles (HDGVs) 
• total vehicle ton-miles of travel per axle • light-duty diesel autos (LDDAs) 
• total fuel use • light-duty diesel trucks (LDDTs) 
• vehicles sold • heavy-duty diesel vehicles (HDDVs) 
• total vehicle-tons manufactured in the 
U.S 
 
• total expenditures on maintenance and 
repair 
 
 
 The use of these allocation factors is straightforward. For example, the HDDV 
fraction of total vehicle ton-miles per axle, multiplied by any total motor-vehicle cost 
that is a function of vehicle ton-miles per axle, tells us the amount of that total cost that 
is assignable to heavy-duty diesel vehicles. Thus, if we know total expenditures for 
highway repair, and believe that highway repair costs are related to ton-miles of travel 
per axle, we can use the ton-mile/axle allocation factors to allocate the total 
expenditures to individual vehicle classes.  
I emphasize, though, that the cost-allocation factors of Table 1-A5 are relatively 
simple, and most often will be but a fairly crude basis for allocating a total cost. Ideally, 
one should use more sophisticated engineering and economic models to estimate the 
marginal costs truly attributable to individual vehicle classes.  
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TABLE 1-A1. SUMMARY OF THE HEALTH, VISIBILITY, AND AGRICULTURE COST OF 
EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 
 
Emitted pollutant --> PM10 VOCs CO NOx SOx VOCs+
NOx  
Ambient pollutants --> PM10 organic 
PM10 
CO NO2, nitrate 
PM10  
sulfate 
PM10  
O3 
g/mi  -- low (11.7-5) 0.20 3.10 38.20 3.60 0.20 6.70 
g/mi -- high (11.7-5) 0.30 3.70 45.30 4.00 0.20 7.70 
$-damages/kg-emitteda       
Health -- low (11.7-7A) 9.75 0.10 0.01 1.17 6.90 0.01 
Health -- high (11.7-7A) 133.78 1.15 0.09 17.29 65.22 0.11 
Visibility -- low (13-3c) 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 
Visibility -- high (13-3c) 3.9 0.1 0.0 1.1 4.0 0.0 
Crops -- low (12-11) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
Crops -- high (12-11) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
 
From Reports 11, 12, and 13 in the social-cost series. Source tables from those reports are shown 
in parentheses.  
 
aDollar value (in 1991 dollars) of health, visibility, and crop damages due to a change in 
ambient pollution resulting from a 10% reduction in direct emissions from all motor-vehicles 
(heavy-duty diesel trucks as well as gasoline passenger cars), in all areas of the U. S. (rural as 
well as urban), in 1990. Emissions from upstream sources such as refineries, and emissions of 
road dust, are not included here. (Reports 11, 12, and 13 do present $/kg results including 
these upstream emissions, and emissions of road dust.) The $/kg cost of a 100% reduction in 
emissions would be similar but not identical, on account of nonlinearities in the damage 
models.  
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TABLE 1-A2. THE MARGINAL COST OF NOISE FROM A 10% INCREASE IN VMT, FOR 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF VEHICLES ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF ROADS, IN URBANIZED AREAS: 
BASE-CASE RESULTS (1991$/1000-VMT) 
 
 Interstate Other 
freeways 
Principal 
arterials 
Minor 
arterials 
Collectors Local 
roads 
LDAs 2.96 4.25 1.18 0.57 0.07 0.00 
MDTs 8.50 13.20 7.02 5.37 1.05 0.00 
HDTs 16.69 30.80 20.07 29.93 4.93 0.00 
Buses 6.36 9.77 7.18 6.42 1.22 0.00 
Motorcycles 17.15 27.03 8.71 4.67 0.56 0.00 
 
From Report #14 in the social-cost series.   
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TABLE 1-A3. SUMMARY OF THE EXTERNAL COSTS OF OIL USE (1991$/END-USE GALLON) 
 
Cost category Gasoline 
vehicles 
Diesel 
vehicles 
All 
vehicles 
Cost basisa 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve - low 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 Middle-East oil? 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve - high 0.0052 0.0064 0.0054 Middle-East oil? 
Defense expenditures -low 0.0056 0.0071 0.0059 Middle-East oil 
Defense expenditures - high 0.0631 0.0779 0.0661 Middle-East oil 
Pecuniary externality - low 0.0285 0.0350 0.0298 U.S. oil use 
Pecuniary externality - high 0.0596 0.0730 0.0623 U.S. oil use 
Price-shock cost to GDP - low 0.0189 0.0231 0.0198 U.S. oil use 
Price-shock cost to GDP - high 0.1889 0.2314 0.1976 U.S. oil use 
Water pollution - lowb 0.0023 0.0026 0.0023 U.S. oil use 
Water pollution - highb 0.0076 0.0084 0.0078 U.S. oil use 
All costs - low 0.056 0.068 0.058  
All costs - high 0.324 0.397 0.339  
 
The cost is equal to the total cost assigned to each vehicle class (Tables 8-1, 8-2, 7-22, and 15-10), 
divided by total gallons of fuel consumed by each class, in 1991 (Table 10-3). (For water 
pollution, see fn b.) Note that in all cases the total costs, and hence the cost/gallon, depend 
directly or indirectly on the level of oil imports. 
 
aStrategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): If the main purpose of the SPR is to buffer against 
disruprtions in the supply of oil, and if the oil supply from the Middle East is more likely to 
be disrupted than oil from anywhere else, then one reasonably might say that the SPR is a cost 
of importing oil from the Middle East. Put another way, if it is true that the U. S. would not 
have an SPR if it did not import oil from the Middle East, then the SPR is a cost of using oil 
from the Middle East.  
  Defense expenditures: We estimate the peacetime and wartime cost of defending oil 
interests in the Middle East; we do not estimate the cost of defending oil interests anywhere 
else.  
  Pecuniary externality: The pecuniary externality is a function of the change in the world 
price of oil as a result of a change in oil use by U. S. motor vehicles. The world oil price of 
course is determined by the use of all oil, not just by the use of imported oil.   
  Price-shock cost to GNP: The exposure of the U. S. economy to oil price shocks depends in 
part on the total value of oil in the U. S. economy.  
  Water pollution: The environmental impact of oil used for motor vehicles in the U. S. 
depends on the amount of oil used by motor vehicles.  
 
bIn Report #9, I estimate damages from spills of all crude oil used for motor fuels, and damages 
from leaks of all motor fuels. Here, I multiply total oil spill damages by the fraction 
attributable to crude used to make gasoline or diesel fuel (from line 4 of Table 10-14), and then 
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divide by total gasoline or diesel fuel consumption in 1991 (Table 10-3). I assume that the 
$/gallon damages from leaking tanks are the same for gasoline and diesel fuel.  
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TABLE 1-A4. THE COST OF TRAVEL TIME IN MOTOR VEHICLES (CENTS/PERSON-MILE) 
 
Type of vehicle and travel External cost Total cost 
 Low High Low High 
Private vehicles for personal purposes     
daily travel 0.91 4.01 16.5 27.8 
long trips 0.42 1.75 11.4 20.2 
Private vehicles for business purposes     
LDAs 0.98 4.56 28.7 43.6 
LDTs without paid drivers 1.79 7.09 34.9 54.1 
LDTs with paid drivers 2.11 5.29 42.3 42.3 
HDTs with paid drivers 2.59 6.48 51.8 51.8 
Buses     
intercity and transit 2.44 9.06 34.3 54.5 
school 0.27 0.73 4.0 4.7 
Public (government) vehicles     
federal civilian 2.79 9.05 54.7 69.6 
federal military 2.14 5.82 42.9 46.6 
state and local civilian 1.90 6.25 37.1 47.5 
state and local police 1.18 3.20 23.6 25.6 
All vehicles 0.96 3.94 19.1 30.0 
 
From Report #4 in the social-cost series. Includes monetary as well as nonmonetary costs. To 
obtain costs per vehicle mile, multiply these cost/person-mile by the persons/vehicle 
occupancy rates estimated in Table 4-1.  
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TABLE 1-A5. TRANSPORTATION QUANTITIES AND ALLOCATION FACTORS FOR 
GASOLINE AND DIESEL MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE U.S., 1991 
 
 Gasoline vehicles Diesel vehicles 
Cost allocation factor LDAs LDTs HDVs LDAs LDTs HDVs 
Vehicle travel (109 VMT) 1,525 439 24 18 13 154 
Fraction of total travel 0.702 0.202 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.071 
Weight-travel (109 ton-miles)a 2,382 853 217 29 28 4,198 
Fraction of total ton-miles 0.309 0.111 0.028 0.004 0.004 0.545 
Fraction of ton0.7-milesb 0.466 0.156 0.025 0.006 0.005 0.342 
Freight ton-miles (109)c 0 305 208 0 12 4,191 
Fraction of freight ton-miles 0.000 0.065 0.044 0.000 0.003 0.889 
109 ton-miles per axled 1,191 424 88 15 14 1,047 
Fraction of ton-miles/axle 0.429 0.152 0.032 0.005 0.005 0.377 
Highway fuel (106 gal) 70,227 28,771 3,367 649 714 24,833 
Fraction of total highway fuel 0.546 0.224 0.026 0.005 0.006 0.193 
Fraction of hwy. gas or diesel 0.686 0.281 0.033 0.025 0.027 0.948 
New vehicles sold (103) 8,164 4,017 40 11 18 290 
Fraction of total number sold 0.651 0.320 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.023 
Vehicle-tons made (103)e 7,703 5,658 327 10 26 2,365 
Fraction of total amount made 0.479 0.352 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.147 
Spent on m & r (106$)f 68,124 27,594 2,264 629 685 16,703 
Fraction of total expenditures 0.587 0.238 0.020 0.005 0.006 0.144 
 
Source: see Report #10 of this social-cost series. 
  All calculations ignore the use of LPG and other alternative transportation fuels, which 
account for but a tiny fraction of motor-vehicle energy use.  
  LDA = light-duty automobiles (includes station wagons and motorcycles but not 
minivans, which are classified as light-duty trucks); LDT = light-duty trucks (those with a 
gross vehicle weight [GVW] rating of 8,500 lbs or less, and a curb[empty] weight of 6,000 lbs 
or less; includes passenger vans and jeeps and utility vehicles); HDV = (heavy-duty vehicles; 
all other trucks, including buses); VMT = vehicle miles of travel; hwy. = highway; m & r = 
maintenance and repair. 
 
aGenerally, ton-miles of travel by a vehicle type is equal to vehicle miles of travel (VMT) 
multiplied by the average weight of the vehicle, including its average payload.     
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bI include this measure of activity because I allocate emissions of particulate matter (dust) from 
roads on the basis of ton0.7-miles of travel (Report #10). This is the same as ton-miles of travel 
except that the vehicle weight is raised to the 0.7 power. I show only the resulting distribution 
here because the absolute ton0.7-miles are not meaningful.  
 
cI assume that only trucks are used to transport freight for business (non-personal) purposes.   
 
dEqual to the ton-miles divided by the average number of axles. I assume that all light-duty 
automobiles have two axles.   
 
eCalculated by multiplying the number of vehicles produced by the average curb weight (in 
tons) of each vehicle, in each category.  
 
fI include this measure because I assume that emissions attributable to the use of motor-vehicle 
services, such as maintenance and repair (m & r), are proportional to the amount of  money 
spent on maintenance and repair (m & r) services.  
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APPENDIX B. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND EFFICIENT 
OPERATION OF MARKETS 
 
 
 Resources are used efficiently when the marginal value to society (MSV) equals 
the market price (P) equals marginal cost to society (MSC). This is intuitively obvious, 
and easy to show.  
 If a consumer is free to choose the amount of an item that she consumes, then she 
will consume until the marginal value ($/unit) is equal to the price ($/unit) that she 
faces. At this point, she will be at her optimal level of consumption. Moreover, if the 
price she faces includes all the costs to society arising from producing or supplying the 
item, and if she considers all the use-values associated with her consumption, then the 
marginal social value of consumption (demand) will equal the marginal social cost of 
production (supply), and such activity summed over all consumers and producers will 
yield an optimal level of production and use for the whole society.   
 This optimum, however, is rarely if ever attained. Most real markets do not 
allocate resources efficiently, according to MSV = P = MSC, because at a minimum most 
production and consumption involves some sort of externality, and most prices are 
influenced by distortionary (non-optimal) taxes.  In fact, there are a variety of reasons 
that a market might not allocate resources optimally, or what is worse, why no private 
market might exist. In the following, I review the conditions required for markets to 
exist and allocate resources efficiently, and what happens if the conditions are not met.  
 If all of the conditions are met, then in theory a market will exist and price will 
equilibrate production and consumption at the point where the marginal social value of 
consumption equals the marginal social cost of production, and the resulting resource 
allocation and use pattern will be optimal and not susceptible to improvement, except 
as a result of changes in technology, resource endowment, or tastes.  
 
1.B.1 Conditions for existence of markets 
 The first five are conditions  for the existence of markets (not necessarily in a 
logical hierarchy): 
 I). First, property rights must be enforceable: it must be possible (and not too 
costly) to enforce a price and assign benefits and costs. Mutually beneficial exchange is 
not possible if the cost and benefits are not assignable.  
  The absence of property rights is a primary cause of an externality, which I 
define elsewhere. For example, too much air pollution results, in part, because presently 
it is impossible to establish ownership of individual molecules of the air.  In the absence 
of optimal regulations or pseudo-markets for air pollution, the air will be overused as a 
dumping ground, and (all else equal) too many air-polluting items will be produced 
and consumed.  
 An externality is a cost or benefit to society that is not accounted for by private 
markets, and therefore results in a divergence between price and marginal social cost41. 
The case of an external cost is illustrated in Figure 1-1, where the demand for motor-
vehicle use, as a function of total price, is the line D, and the marginal private cost of 
motor-vehicle use, as a function of the amount supplied, is line S. The market clears 
                                                
41In this social-cost analysis, I assume that there are no significant external benefits of motor-vehicle use. 
See Rothengatter (1994), and Report #20 of this social-cost series. 
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along S -- because [by definition] consumers consider only priced or “accounted-for” 
costs -- and provides quantity Q at price P. However, unaccounted for costs -- 
externalities -- cause the total marginal social cost S* to exceed the marginal private cost, 
S. As shown in Figure 1-1, the marginal social cost of Q, the amount provided by the 
private market, is P’ (Q intersects S* at x’, which corresponds to P’), which is greater 
than the private-market price P and hence greater than the marginal value of Q. In fact, 
every unit consumed beyond Q* costs society more than it is worth, because beyond Q* 
the social-cost curve rises above the social-value (demand) curve. Therein lies the 
problem. One solution is to price the externality so that the market clears along the 
social-cost curve, at Q* and P*.  
 II). Second, there must be no indivisibility in consumption. If consumption is 
indivisible, then the marginal cost of an additional consumer is zero, and the efficient 
price is zero. In this situation either there will be no private market, or else a private 
market with a non-optimal price -- unless there is perfect discriminatory pricing, in 
which each user is charged the money value of the utility he derives from the good. 
Absent perfect price discrimination, the public sector must determine the optimal 
amount of a public good, and, ideally, finance the good via non-distortionary lump-sum 
transfers from individuals to the public sector.  
 III). Third, indifference curves must be convex; i.e., there must diminishing 
marginal utility in consumption, so that the last unit is worth less than the previous. If 
this does not hold, the demand curve might not intersect the supply curve, and if it does 
not, there will be no market  equilibrium.  
 IV). Fourth, there must not be economies of scale over the relevant range of 
output; i.e., average cost must not decline with output. If the average-cost curve is 
declining, then the revenue from a marginal-cost price will not cover total cost. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1-B1, where the demand curve D’ intersects the marginal cost (MC) 
curve in a region where average total cost (AC) is declining. The result is that the total 
cost of producing the quantity Q’ exceeds the revenues from selling Q’ by the amount 
(Pac’-P’).Q’. [In the “normal” case where demand D* intersects MC in a region of 
increasing costs, total revenues exceed total cost and provide a producer surplus equal 
to (P*-Pac*).Q*]. This situation precludes a competitive market, and might give rise to a 
“natural monopoly.”  
 V). Fifth, there must be no institutional or transactional barriers to the formation 
of markets. This condition is self-explanatory.  
 
1.B.2  Conditions for efficiency 
 The next five are efficiency conditions:  
 VI). Sixth, there must be many buyers and sellers. The most well-known violation 
of this condition, monopoly power, results in an undersupply relative to the 
competitive equilibrium. This is easy to show. A firm, whether a monopoly or 
competitor, maximizes its profit when the marginal cost (MC) of the last unit equals the 
marginal revenue (MR) gained from selling it. In any industry, whether competitive or 
comprising a single firm,  MR = P + Q (dP/dQ), where dP/dQ, the change in price with 
output, is negative because of diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Now, in a 
competitive market, the output of a single firm does not affect price appreciably, and 
hence for the competitive firm dP/dQ is zero, and MR = P. However, the monopolists’ 
output affects price, so that for it, dP/dQ < 0, and MR < P. This is shown in Figure 1-B2. 
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As a result, the monopolist produces less than society is willing to pay for (Q < Q*), and 
so causes a real loss in social surplus (the triangle x-x*-x’).  
 VII. Seventh, everyone must have information on the prices and quality of goods, 
services, and factors of production, and individuals must appreciate the value to 
themselves of their own consumption. These conditions are obvious. If a person is 
uninformed, or does not know his “true” preferences, then he cannot be sure that the 
something is worth what he pays for it; that is, he cannot be sure that MV = P. In 
transportation, for example, it is likely that some drivers underestimate their risk of 
getting into an accident, and consequently drive more than is optimal for them and for 
society.  
 VIII. Eighth, everyone must be free to choose the amount of every product or 
resource that he or she uses. (This condition, broadly construed to include noise, 
pollution, and the like, also is tantamount to stipulating that there are no externalities, 
according to some definitions of “externality”.) If individual  consumers are not free to 
choose the amount they pay and/or consume, then, even if they account for all the costs 
of their consumption, and face full marginal social-cost prices, it will be purely 
coincidental if for their [forced] choice, P = MV. In the case of bundled items, which are 
not priced explicitly but are part of a package that is priced, the requirement is that the 
consumer be free to choose the whole package, assuming that the bundling is efficient 
because of high costs of unbundling.   
 IX. Ninth, there must be no distortionary taxes on production or consumption. 
Taxes drive a wedge between demand price and supply cost; the wedge reduces output 
and thereby results in a “deadweight loss” of social welfare. In  Figure 1-B3, 
government levies a fixed percentage tax on output, which effectively rotates the supply 
curve upward from S to Stax. As a result, the market price increases from P* to Ptax, 
and the quantity demanded contracts from Q* to Qtax.  Government collects tax 
revenues equal to (Ptax-P’).Q’, but the revenues are a transfer from consumers and 
producers, and on balance society loses the consumer and producer surplus on the 
foregone output -- the deadweight triangle x-x*-x’.   
 In a first-best world, government revenues are collected by “lump-sum” taxes -- 
fixed per-capita assessments that are independent of any particular production or 
consumption. If this is impossible, then a second-best solution is to tax so as to 
minimize the deadweight losses, by reducing all outputs by approximately the same 
proportions (Baumol and Bradford, 1970). Generally, the [second-best] optimal tax will 
cause prices to deviate from true marginal cost in inverse proportion to the price 
elasticity of demand, so that the tax will be very high where the demand is very 
inelastic. The rationale for this is intuitively clear: if demand is inelastic, then even a 
large tax will reduce demand only slightly, and cause but a small deadweight welfare 
loss (in Figure 1-B3, the steeper the demand curve D, the smaller the area x-x*-x’).  
 X. Tenth, there must be no distortionary regulations or standards. Unless 
standards are designed to be economically optimal, it is unlikely that the marginal cost 
of the resources devoted to meeting the standards (e.g., the cost of catalytic converters 
required by emissions standards) will equal the marginal economic value provided (a 
reduction in emissions).  
 If all of these conditions are met, then in theory a market will exist and price will 
equilibrate production and consumption at the point where the marginal social value of 
consumption equals the marginal social cost of production, and the resulting resource 
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allocation and use pattern will be optimal and not susceptible to improvement, except 
as a result of changes in technology, resource endowment, or tastes42.   
                                                
42It is worth noting that in the real world, in which many of these conditions are violated, we cannot be 
sure that we will improve things by removing some but not all of the violations. So says the “general 
theory of the second best,” which is presented by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57), Davis and Whinston 
(1965), and Laffont (1990), and briefly in Report #2 of this social-cost series.   
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FIGURE 1-B1. THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING LONG-RUN MARGINAL COST 
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FIGURE 1-B2. EFFICIENCY LOSS DUE TO MONOPOLY 
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FIGURE 1-B3. EFFICIENCY LOSS DUE TO TAXES 
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APPENDIX C. OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS, DATA, AND 
ESTIMATION METHODS FOR SOME OF THE COST ITEMS IN 
TABLE 1-1.  
 
 
1.C.1  Column 1 of Table 1-1 
 •  Travel time, excluding travel delay imposed by others, that displaces unpaid activities.  
I estimate the total cost of nonmonetary personal travel time as a function of total 
person-hours of travel, average speed in uncongested conditions, the fraction of travel 
time that displaces unpaid activities, the opportunity cost of travel time, the hedonic 
cost of travel time, and other factors. The opportunity cost of travel time is equal to the 
value of activities foregone while in the car. (By definition, the opportunity cost of 
nonmonetary travel time is not paid work, but rather leisure or unpaid work.) The 
hedonic cost is the pure utility or disutility of the driving experience itself. We use the 
data tapes from the Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (FHWA, 1991) to analyze 
travel time as a function of income, mode, and trip purpose.  
 • Accidental pain, suffering, death, and lost nonmarket productivity inflicted on oneself.  
In general, I distinguish three kinds of pain, suffering, and lost productivity costs of 
motor-vehicle accidents. Those inflicted by an individual on himself are personal 
nonmonetary costs, and are included in column 1. Those inflicted but also paid for by 
another, via liability insurance or out-of-pocket payments, become priced pain and 
suffering (etc.) and are included in column 2.  Finally, those inflicted and not paid for by 
another are nonmonetary externalities, and are included in column 643.  
 I use total social-cost functions and marginal social cost functions to estimate the  
nonmonetary (and monetary) personal and external costs of motor-vehicle accidents. 
Costs are estimated as a function of vehicle miles of travel, vehicle occupancy, the injury 
or accident rate, and the cost per injury or accident. The injury or accident rate and the 
cost per injury or accident are specified separately for eight different kinds of injury 
accidents (Blincoe, 1996, Miller, 1997). Marginal external costs are estimated as the 
difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost, less estimated 
user liability payments. The cost functions are derived, and the parameter values 
documented, in Report #19.  
 • Motor-vehicle noise and air pollution inflicted on oneself (included with external costs 
of column 6).  Noise costs and air pollution costs in principle can be disaggregated into 
                                                
43An accident cost incurred by driver D is an externality if the cost could have been avoided had another 
person not driven, and if that other person has not paid the cost, either out of pocket or through 
insurance. It matters not who is liable legally  for the cost, or whether D’s insurance covers the cost. That 
is, even if the insurance  company of the party not economically responsible for the cost pays the cost, the 
cost still is external, because it is not accounted for  by the responsible party. The necessary and sufficient 
condition for a monetary externality is that the responsible party does not face a price and pay the cost; 
beyond that, it does not matter who actually ends up paying the cost.. 
 This treatment of accident externalities is not ignorant of Vickrey’s (1968) “paradox,” which is 
that the full cost of an accident involving  two parties is attributable to both parties, because had either not 
driven there would not have been an accident. Vickrey’s observation is correct, but not preclusive of a 
simple, optimal pricing strategy: namely, charge each driver for the expected damage (risk) inflicted on 
the other, and let each driver bear as an unpriced personal nonmonetary cost the risk that he faces. In this 
way, the externalities are properly (but not doubly) priced, and all of the risks are properly accounted for 
as risks imposed and risks faced.   
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costs inflicted by motor-vehicle users on themselves (personal nonmonetary costs), and 
costs inflicted on others (external costs). Usually, however, this distinction is not made, 
on the presumption that the personal nonmonetary costs are trivial compared to the 
external costs. This assumption most likely is correct in the case of air pollution,  
because the exhaust plume is directed away from the vehicle, and most pollutants 
disperse widely (although researchers have found that levels of carbon monoxide (CO) 
inside vehicles are much higher than ambient levels [Ott et al., 1994]). In the case of 
noise, though, it is not immediately obvious that personal nonmonetary costs are trivial 
compared to external costs,  because vehicular noise is intense at the source, and 
diminishes rapidly with distance. Nevertheless, we have followed the usual practice, 
and have not estimated personal noise or air-pollution costs apart from the external 
costs. We report the total external+personal-nonmonetary cost as an externality, in 
column 6. The analysis is summarized in Report #9, and presented in full detail in 
Report #14.    
 
1.C.2  Column 2 of Table 1-1 
 I have included in this column several items that most other analysts and most 
GNP-type accounts usually do not include as costs of owning and operating motor-
vehicles. The “User Operated Transportation” categories of the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) of the United States (e.g., Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1990; 
Survey of Current Business,  July, 1992), the FHWA’s Cost of Owning and Operating 
Automobiles, Vans, and Light Trucks (1984, 1992), the U. S. Department of Labor’s 
Consumption Expenditure Surveys (e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1992), 
Runzheimers’ (1992) Survey & Analysis of Business Car Policies and Costs 1991-1992;  and 
the financial profile of automobiles in National Transportation Statistics  (1992; their data 
are from the NIPA and the FHWA’s Highway Statistics)  do not include in their 
transportation accounts the following costs: compensated work travel time;  the 
overhead expenses of business, commercial, and government fleets; accident costs paid 
for by responsible party, but not through automobile insurance; vehicle inspection by 
private companies; or the cost of legal services and security devices. They do not 
include them either because they have overlooked them, or because (in the case of the 
NIPA and Consumer Expenditure Surveys) they classify them elsewhere, as legal costs, 
medical costs, housing costs, and so on, rather than as personal transportation costs.     
 There is no doubt, however, that these are costs of motor-vehicle use. For 
example if there were no motor vehicles, there would be no vehicle inspection costs, 
and no out-of-pocket costs of motor-vehicle accidents. With regards to economic 
efficiency, the issue here is whether or not motor-vehicle users recognize that these are 
costs of motor-vehicle use. That is, even though these costs are explicitly priced, they 
might be overlooked and omitted from the decision calculus. The out-of-pocket costs of 
motor-vehicle accidents  might be an example of this sort of unaccounted-for cost. 
 • Annualized cost of the motor-vehicle fleet.   The annualized replacement cost of the 
motor-vehicle fleet is the market value of the present fleet, less producer surplus, 
annualized over the life of the fleet at relevant interest rates. The market value is equal 
simply to the unit price (excluding sales taxes) multiplied by the number of units, in 
each of six classes of motor vehicles. All producer taxes are deducted en masse in a 
separate line in this column.  
 The annualized replacement cost so estimated is equivalent to: i) the annualized 
cost of doubling the present fleet at present prices; ii) the annualized cost, in the long 
run, of maintaining the present fleet by replacing vehicles as they retire; and iii) the 
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annualized cost, in the short and long run, of maintaining the present fleet and of failing 
to liquidate the present fleet, if its liquidation value is inversely proportional to its life.   
 If a vehicle is totaled in an accident, and the party economically responsible does 
not pay, either out of pocket or through insurance, the replacement cost is an externality 
(see above for my definition of accident externality). Such external replacement costs 
are included in column 5.   
 • Cost of motor fuel. This is equal to the pre-tax cost per gallon of motor fuel, 
multiplied by the number of gallons of motor-fuel consumed, less a detailed estimate of 
producer surplus accruing to oil producers, and less the cost of excess motor-fuel 
consumed as a result of travel delay. The last is a monetary externality, included in 
column 5.  
 • Part, supplies, maintenance, repair.  All such costs paid for by the economically 
responsible party, either out of pocket or through automobile insurance, are included 
here. (The cost of normal wear and tear, and the cost of accidental damage covered by 
the insurance of the responsible party, are examples.) All external property damage due 
to accidents is included in column 5, as a monetary externality.  
 • Automobile insurance: administrative and management costs and profit only.  I count 
as a cost of insurance per se only the administrative and management cost and profit of 
providing the insurance service. All of the costs actually paid by insurance companies 
either are “Private monetary costs of motor-vehicle accidents...”, itemized separately in 
this column, or else monetary externalities, in column 5.    
 • Private monetary costs of motor-vehicle accidents.  Here, I include all of the 
monetary costs of motor-vehicle accidents that are not externalities: property damage, 
medical care, legal and other services, and so on. Included, and itemized separately, are 
payments (such as insurance liability payments) by motor-vehicle users for costs that 
they inflict on others. The cost of administering and managing insurance also is 
itemized separately, in this column. Costs not paid for by the responsible party are 
monetary externalities, in column 5. Report #19 gives the details of the estimates of 
accident costs. 
 • Travel time, excluding travel delay imposed by others, that displaces paid work.  We 
estimate the total cost of travel time in this category as a function of total person-hours 
of travel, the ratio of uncongested speeds to congested speeds, the fraction of travel time 
that displaces paid activities, the opportunity cost of travel time, and other factors. By 
definition, the opportunity cost of monetary travel time is paid work, not leisure or 
unpaid work. If the travel displaces leisure or unpaid work, then the travel time has a 
nonmonetary cost and belongs in column 1 or 6, not in column 2 or 5.  
 Note that, in determining whether the travel-time cost is “monetary,” we do not 
care whether the traveler is reimbursed for travel; rather, we care whether the activities 
that are foregone because of the travel are themselves directly valued in dollars. For 
example, if “business” travel displaces paid work, then the cost of the travel time is the 
value of the foregone productivity, which I assume is the full compensation rate in 
current employment (see the discussion in Report #5). In this case, business travel has a 
monetary cost and belongs in column 2 or 5,  regardless of whether or not the traveler is 
reimbursed explicitly for travel time per se. However, if business travel actually 
displaces leisure time, then the travel time has a nonmonetary cost and belongs in 
column 1 or 6, even if the traveler is paid a salary during the travel or is reimbursed, 
because leisure time, which is the opportunity cost, is not valued directly in dollars.  
 • Overhead expenses of fleets. Business, government, and commercial vehicle fleets 
have overhead expenses for administrative staff, garage and repair facilities, and motor-
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vehicle related equipment. These expenses are costs of motor-vehicle use, and are not 
included in any other cost item in this table.   
 • Vehicle inspection by private companies.  I include here only those payments to 
private inspection stations, because payments to government-run stations presumably 
are included in expenditures for the highways reported in the Federal Highway 
Administration’s annual Highway Statistics report. Also, privately run inspection 
stations presumably charge marginal costs, whereas government stations might not.  
• Deduction of taxes and fees embedded in price-times-quantity estimates. The 
preceding estimates of the supply cost of motor-vehicles goods and services exclude 
retail sales taxes, and federal, state, and local excise taxes on motor fuels. However, 
because they are price-times quantity estimates, they still include taxes “embedded” in 
the price: namely, excise, income, or property taxes paid by producers. For example, our 
estimate of the supply cost of gasoline excludes retail sales taxes and the motor-fuel 
excise tax, but it includes the cost of corporate income taxes paid by oil companies, and 
environmental excise taxes paid by oil producers. Similarly, our estimate of the supply 
cost of motor vehicles excludes sales taxes, but includes gas-guzzler taxes and emission-
certification fees.  
These embedded taxes and fees should not be included in an estimate of the true 
private-sector resource cost of  motor-vehicle goods and services, because they either 
are transfers from the private sector to the government, or else inefficient charges for 
government services44. If they are the latter, then they do not properly represent the 
cost of the services. In this case, the best way to do the accounting is to eliminate the 
taxes from the private-sector ledger and perform a separate estimate of the actual cost of 
the government services and record the estimated cost in public-sector ledger.  
 
1.C.3  Column 3 of Table 1-1 
 • Annualized cost of non-residential offstreet parking. The annualized replacement 
cost of all off-street nonresidential parking in private lots and garages is equal simply to 
the average annualized capital+land45 cost per space plus the annual operating and 
maintenance cost per space, multiplied by the total number of spaces.  
 In this calculation, the most difficult parameter to specify is the total number of 
offstreet, nonresidential, improved private parking spaces. To estimate this parameter, 
we use two independent approaches and data sets. In the first method, the total number 
of spaces is equal to the number of offstreet nonresidential parking spaces for 
employees plus the number of privately owned parking spaces for others. In the second 
method, we use data on parking requirements and building areas to estimate the total 
number of spaces as  Σ Pt.Ft  where Pt is the number of parking spaces, required by 
                                                
44If any of the environmental excise taxes actually were correctly calculated and applied Pigovian taxes, 
equal to marginal residual environmental damages, then it would reasonable to leave the taxes and the 
damages that they represented embedded in the private cost. In this case, there would be no externality 
(because the cost would be correctly internalized), and hence no cost estimated in column 6 of Table 1-1. 
However, none of the environmental excise taxes (not even the charge for the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund) appear to be correctly calculated and applied Pigovian taxes.  
 
45Because land yields services in perpetuity, the rent, or annualized cost, is equal simply to the value 
multiplied by the relevant discount rate.  
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ordinance, per square foot of building type t, and  Ft is square feet of building or 
activity type t. Happily, these two methods yield similar results. 
 As a check on our estimate of average-cost/unit multiplied by the number of 
units, we have made an estimate of the potential revenues that could be collected from 
all users at the current prices and level of demand for parking. In theory, the estimated 
potential revenues should at least equal the estimated total cost. As shown in Report #6, 
they do.  
 • Annualized cost of home garages, carports, and other residential offstreet  parking. 
This is the annualized replacement cost of all residential parking spaces, given the 
distribution of parking places (carport, 1-car garage, 2-car garage, parking lot space, 
etc.) at new homes, plus 1990-91 maintenance and repair costs, and average annual 
alteration and addition costs. Generally, we multiply the total square footage in garages, 
carports, or other offstreet parking spaces, by the annualized construction cost and 
annual operations, maintenance, and repair cost per unit area or space. We use data 
from recent, comprehensive surveys of characteristics of housing (e.g., Bureau of the 
Census, American Housing Survey for the United States in 1993, 1995) to estimate the area 
or number of parking spaces, and the fraction of spaces devoted to motor vehicles. 
 
1.C.4  Column 4 of Table 1-1 
 • Annualized cost of public highways.  My estimate is based on a detailed analysis 
of expenditure data reported in FHWA’s Highway Statistics  (various years; e.g., FHWA, 
1993). However, there are considerable differences between my estimate of the 
annualized cost, and the FHWA’s estimate of total expenditures. Most importantly, I 
estimate the annualized replacement cost of the entire capital stock, and add this to the 
annual operating and maintenance costs, whereas the FHWA adds annual capital 
expenditures to annual operating and maintenance expenditures. In essence, I have 
included an interest charge on all capital, whereas the FHWA counts only the interest 
actually paid on borrowed funds.   
 I also have added several costs not included in the FHWA’s summaries: i) the 
states’ costs of collecting and administering highway user fees; ii) the cost of the 
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund; iii) the cost of under-maintenance 
(actually, the additional expenditures required to maintain conditions, or the additional 
future time and travel cost to drivers of the deteriorating conditions) (Memmot et al., 
1993); and iv) land costs not included in the outlay data reported to FHWA. 
 On the other hand, I exclude most of what the FHWA classifies as debt 
retirement and interest, because most of this cost is accounted for by the  annualization 
of the capital cost. Also, I classify the cost of highway police separately, below, rather 
than as a cost of highways per se. 
 As discussed in Report #7, FHWA statistics on highway expenditures might 
include expenditures that are really a cost of bicycle or pedestrian use of roads. I have 
made a minor, ad-hoc adjustment to account for this.   
 • Police protection, fire protection, judicial and legal system, corrections, energy and 
technology R & D, and regulation and control of pollution,  Generally, I estimate the motor-
vehicle-related cost of these services as some fraction of the total cost: 
MVC = 1− AFnoMVK( ) ⋅AC91, where MVC is the motor-vehicle-related cost of the 
government service, AC91 is the total annualized cost of the service in 1991 (annualized 
cost of the capital stock, plus operating and maintenance costs) (Bureau of the Census, 
Government Finances: 1990-1991, 1993), AFnoMV is the activity level in the absence of 
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motor-vehicle use (expressed as a fraction of the total activity in 1991), and the exponent 
K determines the shape of the nonlinear cost vs. activity function. The activity measures 
are related to the cost of providing the service: crimes, arrests, fires, time spent hearing 
cases, prisoner-months of incarceration, or pollution.  In the case of crimes as a measure 
of the activity, the estimation of AFnoMV considers the extent to which crimes not 
nominally related to motor-vehicle use (e.g., robberies in parks) might substitute for 
crimes that nominally are related to motor-vehicle use (e.g., robberies in parking lots). 
However, my estimates of this “substitute” fraction, as well as my estimates of the 
shape exponent K, are my judgment.  
 • Military expenditures related to the use of Persian-Gulf oil by motor vehicles.  We 
start with an estimate of total military expenditures to defend all U.S. interests in the 
Persian Gulf, and estimate and subtract the portions of that total expenditure that we 
believe are meant to protect interests other than the use of oil by motor vehicles. First, 
we estimate and subtract expenditures to protect non-oil interests (e.g., general strategic 
interests, and the interests of non-petroleum businesses) in the Persian Gulf. Then we 
estimate and subtract expenditures meant to protect against Persian-Gulf-born oil price 
shocks that might cause a world-wide recession. We estimate these costs irrespective of 
U.S. production or consumption of Persian-Gulf oil, because the U.S. would be affected 
by such a recession even if it did not produce or consume oil from the Persian Gulf. 
Next, we estimate and subtract expenditures to protect the investments of U.S. 
producers in the Persian Gulf, apart from the interests of U.S. oil consumers. Finally, we 
estimate and subtract expenditures to protect the use of oil by all except motor-vehicle 
users. What is left, in principle, is the military cost of the use of Persian-Gulf oil by 
motor vehicles specifically. Mostly our analysis is illustrative, not quantitative. All of 
the steps (including the first, the estimate of expenditures to defend the gulf) are 
uncertain and difficult to estimate, because of joint production and other problems.  The 
analysis is presented in Report #15. 
 Note that we have not estimated the military cost of defending oil or 
infrastructure interests in other parts of the world. Nor have we estimated the potential 
costs of whatever threats to U. S. interests remain in spite or perhaps even because of 
U.S. defense expenditures (except to the extent that the threat of an oil supply 
disruption, which we do estimate, is a “residual” of U. S. defense efforts).   
 Not included: tax subsidies.  Note that I have not included here as a cost “general 
government services,” “social-overhead,” or “tax-subsidies.” Some analysts (e.g., Lee, 
1994; Litman, 1994) have classified as a social cost the difference between some baseline 
rate of taxation and the actual rate of taxation applied to the production and use of 
motor-vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure. Their reasoning is that general 
government services, such as health, education, and defense, must be paid for by 
general taxes, set at a “fair” or “economically neutral” baseline rate, and that any 
deviation from this baseline rate -- for example, the exemption of gasoline sales from 
the sales tax -- constitutes a cost to society.  
 I object to this on two grounds. First, the general government services that are 
financed by general taxes are not a cost of motor-vehicle use in the economic sense of 
“opportunity cost”. If one expands motor-vehicle use a lot, one eventually may devote 
more resources to fire protection, and perhaps even to the military defense of foreign oil 
supplies, but one will not devote more resources to education or to non-specific national 
defense, all else equal, because these are public goods. (Strictly speaking, no portion of 
the money cost of any public good is a cost of any particular transportation system.) In 
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principle, public goods should be handled in a separate account, and financed by 
minimally distortionary taxes, such as lump-sum charges.  
 Second, any tax payment, whether greater or less than some arbitrary baseline, is 
in the first instance a transfer from producers or consumers to the government, and not 
representative of a net resource cost. Even if the only  distortion in the U.S. tax system 
were the exemption of gasoline from the sales tax, the true money welfare cost to 
society of failing to tax gasoline would not be the amount of the tax not collected, but 
rather the probably much smaller difference between the total deadweight loss with 
and without the gasoline sales tax (given a fixed tax collection). And given that the U.S. 
tax system is distorted -- non-optimal -- in myriad ways, one cannot even be sure that 
failing to tax gasoline in this wildly distorted system is on balance costly rather than 
beneficial.  
Of course, an analysis of tax subsidies might be pertinent to an analysis of the 
equity of various financing schemes. I do not consider equity in my cost analysis.  
 
1.C.5  Column 5 of Table 1-1 
 • Accident costs not accounted for by economically responsible party.  See the 
discussions of accidents in column 2. 
 • Macroeconomic adjustment costs due to oil-price shocks. The inability of the macro 
economy to adjust efficiently to rapid changes in the price of oil can cause a real 
decrease in economy-wide output, manifest as a reduction in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). This “macroeconomic adjustment cost” (MEAC) is a function of the total level of 
petroleum consumption, the magnitude of the price change, the substitutability of oil in 
the economy, and other factors. To the extent that the MEAC is a real resource cost, a 
function of oil consumption, and not reflected in the price of oil, it is a marginal external 
cost of oil use.   
To estimate the MEAC of using oil, I first specify a a total cost function that 
estimates the MEAC as a function of oil use and other factors. With this function we can 
estimate the $/bbl MEAC of any  change in motor-vehicle use. To calculate the total 
MEAC we simply multiply the $/bbl MEAC by the quantity of crude oil embodied in 
highway fuels. This method includes crude oil embodied in imported gasoline and 
diesel fuel, as well as crude oil imported as such and made in the U.S. into gasoline and 
diesel fuel, but does not include any non-crude components of gasoline, such as 
natural-gas liquids and alcohols. It also does not count oil consumed “upstream”  by 
petroleum refineries, motor-vehicle manufacturing plants, and so on..  
 Although some early research (e.g., Bohi, 1991) argued that the apparent 
macreconomic-adjustment losses of GDP are due to [bad] government policies (such as 
tight monetary policy) rather than oil price spikes per se, more recent research seems to 
reject the hypothesis that the economic downturns that follow oil price shocks can be 
attributed solely to monetary policy (Paik, 1996; Leiby et al., 1997; Jones et al., 2004).  
 It is important to keep in mind that here we are interested here in the cost to 
society in addition to the actual price-times-quantity payment for oil. That is, in this 
analysis, I estimate the economic cost that: 1) would not be incurred if motor vehicles 
did not use oil, and 2) is in addition to the price-times-quantity payment for oil, which, 
net of producer surplus, taxes and fees, and externalities, is a private-sector cost 
included in column 2 of Table 1-1. This is not the same as the cost to society of the world 
oil price being higher than it would be if the world oil market were perfectly 
competitive (which is what Greene and Leiby [1993] estimate).  
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 • Pecuniary externality: ordinary price effect of using petroleum fuels. This is a 
pecuniary externality -- a wealth transfer between consumers and producers -- and not 
a true resource cost to the world economy. However, if a particular class of producers 
(e.g., foreign oil producers) is excluded from the cost analysis, then consumer loss is not 
balanced by producer gain, and so is a real net welfare loss within the restricted scope 
of such an analysis.  
 I count as a loss to the U. S. the extra payments from nontransportation sectors to 
foreign oil producers, due to the effect on oil price of demand for motor fuels. I multiply 
the increase in the price of crude oil, due to the use of highway gasoline and diesel fuel, 
by the quantity of foreign crude oil consumed in non- transportation sectors in 1991. 
The key parameters in this calculation are the price elasticities of supply and demand, 
and the amount of foreign crude oil embodied in petroleum consumed by non-
transportation sectors.  
 I have not considered pecuniary externalities outside of the oil industry, and 
have not counted the positive pecuniary externality of higher prices for oil exports46. I 
also have not accounted for the possibility that the foreign producers might return some 
of their oil wealth by purchasing domestic goods and services with a high domestic 
producer surplus.     
 • Monetary, non-public-sector losses from net crimes related to using or having motor-
vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure.  Included here are medical costs, lost productivity, 
and the cost of legal and social services other than government police, fire, legal and 
correctional services, which are in column 4. I include these non-public-sector costs of 
crimes (etc.) because they are in some sense costs of motor-vehicle use: if there fewer 
motor vehicles, or less motor-vehicle infrastructure, there would be less net monetary 
welfare loss due to crimes such as motor-vehicle theft, arson of gas stations, and even 
rape in parking lots. I do not,  however, count as a social cost any portion of the victim’s 
property loss, or forced transfer. Although usually there will be a social cost to 
allocating resources by forced transfer rather than by price-mediated, voluntary 
transactions, the cost typically will not be the market value of the stolen property.   
 In the subtitle, “net” means net of substitute crimes; see the brief discussion of 
police, fire, and related government costs in column 4, and the longer  discussion in 
Report #7.  
 As discussed in Report #2, and in the note to Table 1-1, even though these costs 
are related to using or having motor-vehicle goods, services, or infrastructure, they 
probably should be classified not as externalities, within an economic framework, but 
rather as costs of immoral and illegal behavior, within a broader framework.  
 Not included: urban sprawl.  Some analysts claim that motor-vehicle use adversely 
affects urban form, and creates a cost loosely referred to as “urban sprawl” (e. g., 
Litman, 1994). A specific manifestation of this cost might be the extra cost of building 
water and sewage infrastructure to serve low density communities.   
 That there are relationships between the spatial characteristics of urban areas and 
the cost and service attributes of transportation systems is beyond dispute. Indeed, 
several land-use/transportation models quantify these relationships and tell us how 
changes in the attributes of transportation systems eventually affect locational decisions 
                                                
46In 1995, crude oil exports were less than 1% of consumption of crude oil (Energy Information 
Administration, 1996).  
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and thus certain characteristics of urban areas. Why then have I not listed “urban 
sprawl” as an external cost of motor-vehicle use?    
 The short answer is that the “sprawl” is an effect of locational decisions, which are 
determined partly by characteristics of transportation systems, but not an effect of 
motor-vehicle use per se; and that even if sprawl were an effect of motor-vehicle use, 
there would be no reason to believe that the net effect would be undesirable, and 
thereby a cost  of motor-vehicle use. For example, it is true that if we add a $3/gallon tax 
to motor fuel, we will change the cost of using motor vehicles relative to the cost of 
using other forms of transportation, and thereby affect the locational decisions of firms 
and households. Ultimately, these locational choices will change the total cost of urban 
infrastructure, such as sewage. But the urban-form effect here -- a change in 
infrastructure cost -- results not in any sense from the use of motor vehicles, but from 
locational decisions that are influenced by the cost of all transportation options.   
 We also should be clear that the question of the relationship between motor-
vehicle use and urban form is not  relevant to the question of optimal pricing of public 
resources, although it is relevant to cost-benefit analysis of transportation options or 
policies. Regardless of the relationship between motor-vehicle use and sprawl, the 
efficient pricing policy of course is not to tax or control motor-vehicle use, but rather to 
price at marginal cost all of the relevant urban form resources themselves -- 
infrastructure, esthetics, and so on.   
For these reasons, I think it makes little sense to list “urban sprawl” as a cost of 
motor-vehicle use. This is discussed more in Report #8.  
 
1.C.6  Columns 6a and 6b of Table 1-1 
 • Accidental pain, suffering, death, and lost nonmarket productivity, not accounted for 
by the economically responsible party. See the note pertaining to nonmonetarty accident 
costs in column 147. Accident costs are detailed in Report #19.  
 My estimate of the nonmonetary costs of accidents includes costs inflicted upon 
pedestrians and cyclists and other non-users of motor-vehicles, but it does not include 
the cost of fear and avoidance of motor vehicles.  
 •  Travel delay, imposed by other drivers, that displaces unpaid activities.  The 
nonmonetary travel-time cost of motor-vehicle congestion is equal to the value of 
unpaid activities foregone by drivers during travel delay, plus the pure hedonic cost of 
time spent in congestion. The hedonic cost is a function of several factors, including 
comfort, safety, privacy, available space, amenities, and the amount of effort and 
attention required to control a vehicle. See also the item note for travel time in column 1.  
 • Air pollution inflicted on others.  Motor vehicles and their related emission 
sources, such as petroleum refineries, emit many different kinds of air pollutants, which 
can affect human health, agricultural production, visibility, materials, forests, and so on. 
We have performed detailed estimates of the health costs (Report #11), agricultural 
costs (Report #12), and visibility costs (Report #13) of motor-vehicle air pollution. In the 
following paragraphs, we discuss the estimate of the health costs, which are the largest 
of the three. The methods of estimating the agricultural costs and visibility costs are 
similar in many respects to the methods for estimating the health costs. 
                                                
47See also the discussion in Report #2 of this social-cost series, about rational decision making and 
efficient outcomes as regards the personal non-market costs of accidents. That discussion also is pertinent 
to the setting of proper prices in order to internalize external non-market costs of accidents.  
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 The relationship between changes in emissions related to motor-vehicle use and 
changes in health welfare (measured in dollars) can be modeled in three steps:  
 
 1) relate changes in emissions to changes in air quality;  
 2) relate changes in air quality to changes in physical health effects; and  
 3) relate changes in physical health effects to changes in economic welfare.  
 
 We have made a detailed model of this sort to estimate the cost of the health 
effects of motor-vehicle air pollution.  
 1). We estimate air quality with and without motor vehicles and their related 
emissions, in the year 1990. Air quality with  motor vehicles and related emissions is of 
course just the status quo, which we represent with measurements of actual ambient air 
quality at air-quality monitoring sites in every metropolitan area of the U.S. in 1990. 
This data set (EPA, 1993) is discussed in Report #11. We estimate air quality without 
motor-vehicle related emissions with a relatively simple model of emissions, dispersion, 
and atmospheric chemistry, developed in Report #16.  
Our analysis includes emissions directly and indirectly attributable to motor 
vehicles: evaporative and tailpipe emissions from vehicles; emissions from refueling 
vehicles; emissions from the production, storage, and distribution of gasoline and diesel 
fuel; emissions from the manufacture and assembly of materials for vehicles; emissions 
from re-entrained road dust; and emissions from other sources and activities related to 
the use of motor vehicles and motor-vehicle fuels (see Report #10.) It includes emissions 
of toxic air pollutants (e.g., benzene) as well as emissions of the “criteria” pollutants (or 
precursors to criteria pollutants) regulated by the U.S. Clean Air Act (hydrocarbons [a 
precursor to ozone], nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, and particulate 
matter).  
2). The second major step is to determine the health effects of the estimated 
exposure to air pollution due to motor vehicles. We reviewed hundreds of clinical, 
animal, and epidemiological studies of the health effects of various pollutants, and 
constructed exposure-response functions for each criteria pollutant (ozone, carbon 
monoxide, etc.) and each of a variety of health effects (for example, asthma, or 
headaches). These functions relate the change in health effects to the change in 
exposure. We have developed mortality-risk estimates for those pollutants, such as fine 
particles, which according to some studies are associated with mortality. We also have 
constructed unit-risk functions, which relate the probability of getting a particular type 
of cancer (e.g., leukemia) to the amount of exposure to a particular toxic air pollutant 
(e.g., benzene), for exposure to several toxic air pollutants. For many pollutants and 
health effects we have established upper and lower-bound estimates of the effects of 
exposure.  
Our estimate of the health effects of particulate matter, which is the most 
damaging pollutant, accounts for the likelihood that smaller particles are more 
damaging than larger particles, that geological material is less damaging than 
combustion material, and that particulate-matter emission inventories are seriously mis-
estimated.  
3). In the last step, we estimate the economic value of the estimated health effects. 
Our estimates of the dollar value of health effects are derived from studies of the value 
of lost work days, of restricted activity, of tolerating certain symptoms, and so on 
(Report #11). When we estimate the value of life, which is the most important valuation 
parameter in the analysis, we distinguish future deaths from current deaths, and deaths 
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that would have occurred soon anyway even if there were no pollution  from deaths 
that would not have.  
With these estimates, the total health cost is equal to the change in the effect of 
interest (e.g., number of deaths due to motor-vehicle particulate air pollution) 
multiplied by the dollar value per effect (e.g., the value of life). In Report #11, we 
estimate total dollar health costs for the whole U.S., for urban versus rural areas of the 
U.S., and for eleven different metropolitan areas. We also present the costs in terms of 
$/vehicle-mile traveled and $/kg-pollution-emitted (see Appendix A). 
For a recent review of the literature on the air pollution damages of 
transportation, see Krupnick et al.  (1997). See also the recent methodological reviews by 
Krupnick (1993) and Cifuentes and Lave (1993).  For a recent estimate of air-pollution 
damages in Los  Angeles, see Small and Kazimi (1995).  
 • Global warming . Most atmospheric scientists believe that an increase in the 
concentration of “greenhouse gases” --- primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), ozone (O3), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) -- will increase 
the mean global temperature of the earth. Recently, an international team of scientists, 
working as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has concluded that 
“the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global 
climate” (IPCC, 1995a, p. 5). In the long run, this global climate change might affect 
agriculture, coastal developments, urban infrastructure, human health, and other 
aspects of life on earth (IPCC, 1995b).  
 In principle, the “damage” cost to the U. S. of global warming can be estimated 
simply as the product of fuelcycle greenhouse gas emissions, and warming damages 
per unit of emissions. I review the literature to estimate damage costs per unit of 
emissions, and then use a detailed greenhouse-gas emissions model (DeLuchi, 1991) to 
estimate fuelcycle emissions.   
 Note that I count only the cost to the U.S. of U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions; I do 
not count the cost to other countries. If one chooses to take a worldwide perspective and 
count the cost to the entire world of U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions, then one cannot 
count as a cost the “Price effect of using petroleum fuels...” in column 5, because that is 
a transfer from the U.S. to foreign oil producers and hence not a cost in the global 
market (Gomez-Ibanez, 1997).  
 • Noise.  In Report #14, we develop and document a model of the total external 
damage cost of motor-vehicle noise.  Our general cost model is conceptually 
straightforward: the dollar cost of noise is equal to dollars of damage per excess decibel 
(HV), multiplied by: the annualized value of housing units exposed to motor-vehicle 
noise above a threshold (P); the density of housing units exposed to motor-vehicle noise 
above a threshold (M); the amount of motor-vehicle noise over a threshold (AN); and a 
scaling factor to account for costs in non-residential areas ((To+Ti)/Ti).  
 We find that the external damage cost of direct motor-vehicle noise could range 
from less than $1 billion per year to tens of billions per year, although we believe that 
the cost is not likely to much exceed $10 billion. In sensitivity analyses presented in 
Report #14, we show that this wide range is due primarily to uncertainty regarding the 
cost of noise per decibel above a threshold, the amount of noise attenuation due to 
ground cover and intervening structures, the threshold level below which damages are 
assumed to be zero, average traffic speeds, and the cost of noise outside of the home. 
Our estimates do not include the cost of “indirect” motor-vehicle noise, such as from 
highway construction, or the cost of controlling noise related to motor-vehicle use, or 
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the loss of use of property that is unused because of motor-vehicle noise. Also, our 
estimates assume that motor vehicles are the only source of noise.   
 • Water pollution.  It is especially difficult to model the national cost of 
groundwater pollution from leaking underground storage tanks and urban runoff. 
Instead of developing a formal model, I reviewed some of the relevant literature, and 
made educated guesses as to the likely magnitude of the cost. As shown in Table 1-9, I 
estimate that the external damage costs are rather small, in part because regulations 
passed in 1988 required tank owners to retrofit existing tanks with release-detection 
systems and maintain financial assurance to cover the costs of clean up and third-party 
liability.   
 I also have not formally modeled oil-spill costs, and instead have based my 
estimate on a review of some of the literature.  One potential modeling difficulty here is 
that, technically, in order to attribute the cost of oil spills to motor-vehicle use, one must 
trace through how a change in demand for motor fuels affects the world market for oil 
and the  production and shipping decisions of oil producers. At the margin, oil spills 
that affect the U.S. may or may not be a cost of motor-vehicle use in the U.S.; the 
outcome depends on details of producer behavior that we have not modeled. (See 
Report #9 for further discussion.) 
 • Nonmonetary costs of net crimes and fires related to using or having motor-vehicle 
goods, services, or infrastructure.   The costs estimated here include pain and suffering and 
lost nonmarket productivity due to crimes and fires related to using or having motor-
vehicle goods, services or infrastructure. See the note regarding monetary losses from 
motor-vehicle-related crimes, in column 5.   
• Costs not estimated.   All of the costs not estimated, including all of the non-
monetary costs of the motor-vehicle infrastructure, are real costs of highways and 
vehicles, and in principle should be estimated and included in the social-cost totals. 
However, we were not able to make even remotely credible estimates. Of course, one 
should not infer therefore that these costs necessarily are trivial.  
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APPENDIX D. PAYMENTS BY MOTOR-VEHICLE USERS FOR THE 
USE OF THE HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC MOTOR-
VEHICLE SERVICES 
 
 
 There is a good deal of argument about whether motor-vehicle users “pay” fully 
for government-provided motor-vehicle infrastructure and services.  Lee (1994), 
MacKenzie et al. (1992), and others have argued that payments by users fall well short 
of outlays by the public for roads and related services. But Beshers (1994)  and Lockyer 
and Hill (1992) claim that road-user tax and fee payments at least equal government 
expenditures related to motor-vehicle use, and Dougher (1995) argues that road-user 
payments exceed related government outlays by a comfortable margin.  
 The disagreement, of course, results mainly from different opinions about how to 
count “user payments”, although there also is disagreement about the other side of the 
ledger, public-sector expenditures. Some of the arguments about user payments stem 
from confusion about the purpose of and proper conceptual approach to whole 
exercise. In Report #17, I attempt to clear up some this confusion. In this Appendix I 
summarize briefly the results of that analysis.   
 I emphasize that, properly understood, the debate here is about equity -- whether 
users pay a “fair” amount -- and not about economic efficiency. Simply put, a 
comparison of current tax and fee payments, however defined, with current motor-
vehicle-related costs, however defined, tells us nothing at all about optimal pricing, 
optimal revenues, optimal expenditures, or optimal use of public or private 
transportation resources. The reason for this is two-fold:  i) none of the current user 
taxes and fees of Table 1-D1 are marginal-cost prices or optimal departures from 
marginal-cost pricing; and ii) efficiency does not require that revenues from user 
charges equal or exceed government expenditures48.   
 
1.D.1 Current user taxes and fees are not efficient charges for government-provided 
motor-vehicle infrastructure and services.   
 The most important condition of economic efficiency is short-run marginal-cost 
pricing (Table 1-2;  see also Gillen [1997] and the Congressional Budget Office [1992]), 
which when applied to highways and public motor-vehicle services would result in a 
charge structure that would look nothing like the present charge structure, and which 
would not necessarily generate revenues equal to government expenditures. An efficient 
highway-user charge would have two components: a variable-cost charge, equal to the 
cost of wear of the highway per mile of travel, and a congestion charge, equal to the cost 
of delay imposed on all other travelers as a result of an additional mile of travel by each. 
(Of course, there also should be charges for environmental externalities, but I do not call 
these “highway user” charges.) The congestion toll can be viewed as a “capacity” 
                                                
48If current user charges had the incidence and structure (but not necessarily the magnitude) of correct 
marginal-cost prices, and if it were necessary that optimal pricing of government-provided transportation 
goods and services generated user revenues at least equal to costs, then the difference between user 
revenues and government expenditures would indicate the minimum amount by which user charges 
would have to be increased in the aggregate. But even this  would not be useful information, because it 
would  not tell us how much to increase which charges. 
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charge, because the congestion creates “pressure” on highway capacity, and under 
certain conditions the congestion toll finances the optimal expansion of the highway49.  
 Clearly, none of the present highway user taxes and fees are marginal-cost 
prices50 as outlined above. Consider the most prominent of the present user fees, the 
fuel tax. The excise tax on fuel is a charge per gallon consumed. The public service and 
infrastructure being charged for is highway construction and maintenance. Obviously, 
there is no correspondence between the amount of fuel that a vehicle uses, and the 
amount of congestion that it causes and hence the amount of “pressure” that it places 
on capacity. The gasoline tax looks nothing like an optimal congestion toll.  
 There is a better correspondence between fuel consumption and wear and tear of 
the highways, because the weight of a vehicle affects both its fuel consumption and the 
damage it causes to the road. However, neither relationship (between weight and fuel 
economy, and between weight and road damage) is one of strict proportion, because 
many factors other than total weight affect fuel economy and road damage, with the 
result that a heavier vehicle may have lower fuel consumption and cause less road 
damage than does a lighter vehicle.  
 The upshot, as the FHWA (1982) notes, is that “the relationship of the fuel tax to 
[highway damage] costs is negligible. To impose anything approximating efficient 
highway user charges, new pricing instruments will need to be developed” (p. E-64; 
brackets mine).  The Congressional Budget Office (1992) agrees, noting that “fuel 
taxes...do not correlate closely with the actual costs imposed by specific users” (p. 15), a 
problem which has “led planners to seek taxes or charges that do” (p. 11). Finally, 
Button (1993) remarks that “charges levied on road users relate very little to the costs of 
providing and maintaining the infrastructure provided let alone to wider notions of 
optimizing its use either from a purely traffic perspective or from a much wider social 
perspective” (p. 99). 
The same could be said about other user fees: they certainly are not set at 
marginal cost51. Beyond this, it is clear that with efficient pricing of highways and 
related services, price-times-quantity revenues need not cover costs. An efficient 
variable-cost charge for wear and tear will cover the cost of highway maintenance and 
repair, but an optimal congestion toll may or not cover the optimal long-run capital cost 
of the highway. Indeed, the congestion toll will cover the capital cost only if: a) the road 
is in fact congested (even at its optimal size, it need not be)52, and b) the cost/capacity-
                                                
49The discussion of the relationship between optimal congestion tolls and optimal long-run capacity of 
roads can be found in texts on transportation economics (e.g., Mohring, 1976) or urban economics (e.g., 
Mills and Hamilton, 1984), and in articles on pricing of infrastructure (e.g., Gillen, 1997). 
 
50Some road tolls, probably by coincidence, may be efficient prices. Similarly, some fines, and charges 
levied on producers, may be efficient (equal to marginal cost),  but again most likely only  by coincidence.  
 
51Complicating matters in many cases is the difficulty of determining what exactly is the marginal 
opportunity cost of motor-vehicle use. 
 
52The optimal capacity of the road is that at which the marginal cost of providing an additional unit of 
capacity is just equal to the total willingness to pay for the additional unit of capacity. If capacity can be 
added in infinitesimal increments starting at zero, then generally, willingness to pay for additional 
capacity will be greater than zero only if there is congestion. Thus, if all roads were perfectly malleable all 
the way down to nonexistence, all (are nearly all) optimally sized roads would have some congestion. 
(There still would be exceptions: an optimally sized road for one user could not be congested.) But roads 
are not perfectly malleable; they must be built in discrete units. The most important discrete jump is that 
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unit of the highway is constant or rising with additional capacity53.  If these conditions 
are not met, there will be a revenue shortfall or surplus. Ideally, any revenue shortfall 
will be made up by lump-sum wealth transfers from individuals (non users as well as 
users) to the public sector.  
 
1.D.2   An estimate of tax and fee payments 
Table 1-D1 shows my estimates of tax and fee payments towards government 
provided motor-vehicle infrastructure and services. Although my estimates result in a 
small deficit of payments relative to expenditures (shown in Table 1-7) , there is a wide 
enough range of reasonable opinion about what to count as a tax and fee payment by 
motor-vehicle users (and for that matter, about what to count as a government 
expenditure), that the outcome can range from payments falling modestly short of 
expenditures to payments exceeding expenditures. Specifically, the outcome depends 
on how one defines what is “fair”, and how one treats general sales, income, and 
property taxes on vehicles, fuels, and so on. As regards equity, or fairness, the central 
question is this: do we care only that people who use motor vehicles should pay for the 
government expenditures, in any way, and that people who don’t use motor vehicles 
should not pay, or do we also care how the users pay? If our concern is only that non-
users should not pay, then we will count as a “fair” payment any general sales taxes 
and personal income taxes, paid by motor-vehicle users, that might fund government 
expenditures on motor-vehicle infrastructure and services. In this accounting, all but a 
minuscule amount of the total government expenditures will be covered by user 
payments, because virtually everybody uses motor vehicles in one way or another. The 
tiny (and perhaps zero) portion that will not be covered will be the very small 
contribution of non-users, via general taxes, to the minor fraction of infrastructure and 
service expenditure that is financed out of general taxes rather than special user charges 
such as the gasoline tax.  
We might, however, feel that it is not fair enough to require only that users pay 
and non-users don’t, and that we should require further that users pay through their 
actual use.  Put another way, we might feel that the net revenues generated by taxes and 
fees on vehicles, fuels, drivers, etc. should cover the net government expenditures on 
motor-vehicle infrastructure and services. (The ethical core of this view might be that a 
“fair” treatment of all transportation modes requires that each mode recover its full 
costs through direct user charges.) With this view, we will not count any general tax 
and fee payments that are made by persons who use motor vehicles but that are 
unrelated to the actual use.  
In either view of fairness, the tally of revenues versus expenditures depends on 
how one treats general sales, income, and property taxes on vehicles, fuels, and so on. 
There are two ways to put the issue here. One is: Are these general taxes reasonably 
                                                                                                                                                       
between no road and a one-lane road. Often it will be the case that the total willingness to pay for a one-
lane road will equal or exceed its cost, but that the resultant road never will be congested. In this case, a 
congestion toll will generate no revenues, and the road capital cost will have to be financed by other 
means.  
 
53There has been much debate over whether cost/capacity-unit for highways increases, decreases, or 
remains constant with increasing capacity. Anderson and Mohring (1997) cite studies that found constant 
cost, but Mills and Hamilton (1984) cite studies that found increasing or decreasing costs. If the 
cost/capacity is decreasing, then as discussed in Appendix B, the marginal-cost price, multiplied by 
quantity, will not cover total cost.  
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counted as payments towards government expenditures on motor-vehicle 
infrastructure and services, or should they be counted as payments for other general 
government services? The other way to put it, which I prefer, in principle can be 
answered formally: If vehicle ownership, fuel use, roadway mileage, and so on, 
increased, what on balance would happen to general tax revenues to government? On 
the assumption that the money spent on the additional vehicle use would have been 
spent on something else, the government would receive more general-tax revenue from 
the motor-vehicle sector, but less general-tax revenue from other sectors. How this 
would balance would depend on how much of which goods and services would be 
used in the two scenarios (“more motor-vehicle use” versus “the same motor-vehicle 
use and more use of something else”), and on the tax rates on the various goods and 
services.  
I believe that it is most reasonable to treat general tax payments as payments for 
all general government services -- which include motor-vehicle-related services, but 
also much more (health, education, welfare, defense..) -- rather than as payments for 
government motor-vehicle infrastructure and services exclusively.  Similarly, in my 
estimation, it is not likely that the government would get more general tax revenue 
from increased use of vehicles, fuels, and so on than from increased use of other goods 
and services. As a result, I prefer not to count general sales taxes, income taxes, or 
property taxes as payments towards government expenditures on motor-vehicle 
infrastructure and services.  
Therefore, the accounting of Table 1-D1 includes only those tax and fee payments 
that are levied on or embedded in the cost of motor vehicles, motor fuels, and related 
goods and services. This does include a portion -- albeit a fairly  small portion -- of 
general sales, income, and property taxes levied on or embedded in the cost of motor 
vehicles, motor fuels, and related goods and services. The portion that I count is the 
portion of general taxes that on the average end up funding government motor-vehicle 
infrastructure and services as opposed to other general government services. In any 
case, in Report #17 I present the full amount of most if not all conceivable tax and fee 
payments for motor-vehicle infrastructure and services, so that readers may make their 
own estimates of “fair” payments.  
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TABLE 1-D1. PAYMENTS BY MOTOR-VEHICLE USERS FOR THE USE OF THE HIGHWAY 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC SERVICES RELATED TO MOTOR-VEHICLE USE (109 1991$) 
 
Payment item Low 
cost 
High 
cost 
Qa 
A1. Special taxes and  fees targeted to vehicles and fuels and used for 
MVIS 
   
A1.1. FHWA-estimated federal, state, and local tax, license, and 
toll payments by highway users 
50.4 50.4 A3 
A1.2. Interest earnings on payments invested to cover highway 
and other capital 
29.6 141.1 A3 
A2. Other taxes, fees specifically related to motor-vehicle use.    
A2.1. Taxes and fees dedicated to nonhighway purposes, 
including collection expenses 
15.3 15.3 A3 
A2.2. Property-tax-like fees specifically related to motor-vehicle 
use 
6.5 6.5 A3/4 
A2.3. Extra $ due to Oct. 93 $0.043/gal tax increaseb -- -- A3 
A2.4. The amount extra that would have been collected had 
there been less, or no, tax evasionb 
-- -- C 
[A2] 
A2.5. Air-quality, environmental fees on motor vehicles 0.0 0.0 A3 
A2.6. Environmental excise taxes on petroleumc 0.4 0.4 A3 
A2.7. Gas-guzzler taxes, luxury taxes, other minor taxes 0.3 0.3 A4 
A2.8. Traffic fines and parking fines 6.0 4.0 A2 
A2.9. Public parking fees and all parking taxes 4.2 5.1 A3 
A2.10. Miscellaneous taxes, fees not counted  elsewhere 0.0 0.0 D 
 
Summary table continued on next page. 
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TABLE 1-D1, CONTINUED.  
 
Payment item Low 
cost 
High 
cost 
Qa 
B. Selective taxes, fees on limited commodities and activities.d    
B1. Severance taxes paid on oil and gas (attributed to MV use) 1.8 0.0 A3 
B2. Special property taxes  0.1 0.0 A3 
B3. Special sales taxes 0.8 0.0 A3 
B4. Other selective taxes and fees 0.7 0.0 A3 
 C1. General taxes on a wide range of commodities, activities    
C1.1. Portion of general sales taxes on motor vehicles, fuels, 
parts, and services 
0.3 0.8 A2 
C1.2. Portion of corporate income taxes paid by motor-vehicle 
related industries 
0.2 0.6 A3 
C1.3. Portion of personal income taxes paid by employees in 
motor-vehicle related industries 
0.6 1.9 A2 
C1.4. Portion of general property taxes paid on motor vehicles 
and by motor-vehicle related industries 
0.2 0.4 A3 
C2. Tax expenditures    
C2.1. Tax expenditures: corporate income taxes 0.0 (2.7) A2/
3 
C2.2. Tax expenditures: general  sales taxes 0.0 (3.0) A2/
3 
C2.3. Tax expenditures: property taxes on highways 0.0 (5.9) A3 
 
See the Report #17 for details. “Low cost” means “low social costs net of user payments” and 
hence can have the numerically higher user payments; “high cost” means “high social costs 
net of user payments” and hence can have the numerically lower user payments. See 
Appendix 17-A.3 of Report #17 for further discussion of “low” and “high” user payments in 
this context.  
 
aQ = Quality of the estimate (see Table 1-3). Ratings in brackets refer to the quality of the 
analysis in the literature reviewed.  
 
b In the original version of this analysis I counted the amount extra that highway users would 
have paid in 1991 had the October 1993, $0.043/gal increase in the Federal excise tax and post-
1991 increases in state and local highway-user taxes been in effect. I also estimated how much 
additional tax revenue would have been collected had there been less tax evasion. However, 
because the analysis now has been updated to include public costs and user payments 
through the year 2003, I no longer include these items for the year 1991. (Note that I estimated 
that the post-1991 tax increases generated about $7 billion in additional user payments, and 
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that the post-1991 reduction in tax evasion generated $1 to $3 billion in additional user 
payments. See Report #17.) 
c Most of the environmental excise taxes are for public control and clean up of hazardous waste 
sites and oil spills. However, the oil-spill liability trust fund also is used to compensate for oil-
spill damages. Technically, whatever amount compensates for damages should not be 
included here, but rather in a separate table called “payments for environmental damages”, or 
“Pigovian taxes”. These environmental charges would then be netted against environmental 
damages. However, the amount is too small to worry about. 
d  In the low-cost case I count all of these taxes as payments by motor-vehicle users specifically 
for motor-vehicle use (weight of 1.0). In the high-cost case I treat these taxes as general taxes, 
like a sales tax or an income tax, and count as a user payment for motor-vehicle use only the 
portion that on average goes into general funds and comes out as an expenditure related to 
motor-vehicle use. 
